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DEFENSE POLICYMAKING:
THE POST COLD-WAR ROLES AND MISSIONS DEBATE

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the ability of the President, Congress and Armed Services to formulate and implement defense policy that eliminates duplication and inefficiencies within service roles and missions. The hypothesis examined is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the four military Services will be unable to formulate any significant changes in their own roles and missions because of a dichotomy between what the Services see as significant change (read structure) and what Congress sees as significant change (read budget). The Services inability to make change will force Congress to take the lead in the defense reform effort. However, congressional efforts to formulate and implement defense policy will prove imperfect again, unless Congress can first reform itself. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin has the best opportunity to formulate and implement defense policy for a post-Cold War environment. This thesis begins with a brief overview on the origins of the present day roles and missions debate, and is followed by an examination of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that provides insight as to how legislators might work with or against the President and Services in reallocating service roles and missions. The current debate over service roles and missions is examined along with constraints and implications of defense policymaking.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Defense Policymaking: The Post-Cold War Roles And Missions Debate

LT Michael A. Hall, USN
June 1993

The geopolitical changes that have fundamentally altered the threats to U.S. national security combined with rising budget deficits have created an opportunity and necessity for change throughout the Department of Defense. These events will not only reduce the size of the defense budget, but propel an overall reconsideration of the Services roles, missions and functions. Senator Sam Nunn SASC Chairman, in a July 2 floor speech entitled, *The Defense Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul The Services Roles And Missions*, argued that our nation can no longer afford inter-service rivalry, and that redundancy and duplication in the current allocation of roles and missions is costing billions of dollars each year.

Senator Nunn's speech on the Senate floor was a mandate for inter-service debate over roles and missions. The essence of his mandate is his fear that a failure to eliminate needless duplication and inefficiencies within the Services will lead to a "diminished" military capability. Nunn's speech was given in anticipation of General Powell's February 1993 report entitled, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States*. Powell's report suggested ways to make the military more efficient, but did not call for radically reshaping the four Services. The report "rebuffed" the type of

consolidation that Congress and President Clinton has called for. The dissatisfaction with the report for its possible lack of vision, highlights what is fast becoming the preeminent defense policy issue of the post-Cold War era.

In response to this defense policy issue, this thesis examines the ability of the President, Congress and Armed Services to formulate and implement defense policy that eliminates duplication and inefficiencies within service roles, missions and functions. This thesis argues that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the four military Services are unable to formulate any significant changes in their roles, missions and functions. In support of this claim, the first evidence presented, stems from a dichotomy between what the Services see as significant change (read structure) and what Congress sees as significant change (read budget). Analysis provided in Chapter Four by Mackubin Thomas Owens puts this dichotomy into perspective. He argues that the Strategist (Services), seek military effectiveness at the cost of efficiency as opposed to Congress who seeks efficiency. The strategist also sees duplication as the military obligation to have enough means to ensure victory. In addition, it is complimentary and provides a broad range of unique capabilities that can be brought to bear as required by the situation. Where Congress may see wasteful duplication, the military planner sees an array of tools that will allow him/her to carryout a variety of operations and meet strategic requirements. In addition to the dichotomy between the Services and Congress, institutional barriers, sunk costs and use of uncertainty and threat all factor in the inability of the Services to reform themselves.

Congress' ability to formulate and implement defense policy that realigns,

consolidates or abolishes service roles and missions, is much harder to determine. This thesis argues three reasons as to why Congress is not well suited to **formulate** defense policy that seeks to eliminate duplication and inefficiencies within service roles and missions. First, formulating defense policy regarding service roles and missions would be doing what critics argue as something it is institutionally not well suited to do. Robert Art argues it is the job of the Executive Branch to initiate policy and that of the Congress to judge policy.

Although "Congress tends to abhor a policy vacuum," and will push for their own proposals for change, this is not the case with roles and missions. This leads to the second reason: the impact upon the budget. Unlike past reform efforts that were centered around structure and authority i.e., Goldwater-Nichols, legislation associated with reorganizing service roles and missions is centered around budget line-items. The third point is constituent-oriented concerns. Eliminating roles and missions may prove too difficult for legislators who are less concerned with formulating policy and more concerned with satisfying narrow constituent-oriented concerns.

This thesis concludes that the Executive Branch under the leadership of Secretary of Defense Les Aspin has the best opportunity to formulate and implement significant defense policy. Several factors are presented in Chapter V that must occur, if Aspin is to be successful. First, Clinton must back Aspin with the required political capital. Second, the Clinton Administration must produce a National Security Strategy and Military Strategy that provides a vision outlining U.S. interests and objectives that will serve as broad policy guidance necessary for a detailed review

of roles and missions. Third, Aspin must have the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services. The upcoming selection of the new CJCS is critical to the administration. Their choice must be visionary and possess strong leadership that can unite the Services in supporting future reform. Les Aspin's congressional experience coupled with his systems analyst approach to doing business, will prove successful in his quest to shape the Services for a post-Cold War environment. Aware of institutional and bureaucratic barriers, Aspin will seek a defense policy that reflects his congressional experience and be a policy workable to both Services and Congress.

The thesis conclusion is that while the Services are the least likely group capable of proposing any changes, the Executive Branch is the most likely to formulate and implement significant defense reform. Congress, on the other hand will avoid policy formulation because judging policy is something it is institutionally not well suited to do. Congress does play a "*de facto*" role in policy implementation through appropriations. However, Congress will be reluctant to enact significant change in order to protect constituent benefits.

I. INTRODUCTION

The world's strategic landscape has changed dramatically over the past four years. In addition, the nation's fiscal situation is creating great pressures to utilize military capabilities more efficiently and will compel a new look at service roles and functions, which may well lead to changes in U.S. force structure and defense policy. The Clinton administration has already denounced the Bush administrations Base Force plan as ill-suited for the post-Cold War world. Clinton has also proclaimed his desire for military reorganization to eliminate duplication, such as separate air forces and many service support functions. In addition, Clinton has proposed using the Services for domestic missions, such as infrastructure, education and rural health problems.¹

The post-Cold War environment, compounded with the current budget deficit crisis, has compelled Senator Nunn to launch a debate regarding the elimination of duplication and inefficiencies within the Services roles, missions and functions. Amidst declining defense budgets, Congress, the Services, and Executive Branch are faced with the challenge of realigning, consolidating or even abolishing service roles and missions. This thesis examines the ability of

¹William Mathews, "There will be change, but it will take time," Army Times, 16 November 1992, 12.

Congress, the Services and Executive Branch to formulate and impliment defense policy shaped for a post-Cold War era.

Geopolitical changes have fundamentally altered the threats to U.S. national security. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact virtually ended the chances of a major East-West conventional war in Europe, thus eliminating the rationale for maintaining large U.S. standing forces in Europe and large reserve forces at home that could be rapidly mobilized. This era also witnessed the former Soviet Union reach agreement with the United States on wide-ranging reductions in strategic and conventional forces. Enhanced East-West cooperation has been characterized by even deeper cuts to strategic nuclear forces as outlined by current START II levels. Joint support for military action in the Persian Gulf coupled with Western economic assistance in the restructuring of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union further illustrate East-West cooperation.

In addition to East-West cooperation, the United States is facing a significant fiscal crisis. The budget deficit for 1992 was estimated at 290.2 billion dollars.² Table 1 illustrates under current policy the projected growth of the budget deficit through fiscal year 2003.

²Congress, Congressional Budget Office, Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options, A report to the Senate and House Committees on the Budget, February 1993, p.4.

TABLE 1
DEFICIT PROJECTIONS, FY 1993-2003
FY BILLIONS % of GDP

1993	310	6.0
1994	291	4.6
1995	284	4.1
1996	287	4.0
1997	319	4.2
1998	367	4.6
1999	404	4.9
2000	466	6.3
2001	613	6.8
2002	679	6.2
2003	663	6.8

Source: Congressional Budget Office February 1993

These projections assume that laws are not changed and that discretionary spending keeps up with inflation once the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) caps expire. Deficits will jump from \$310 billion in fiscal year 1993 to \$653 billion by fiscal year 2003. As a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), the federal deficit would decline from five percent to four percent between 1993 and 1996, rising again to almost seven percent by 2003. In 2003, the federal deficit will reach its largest percentage of GDP in more than 50 years.³

What does a budget deficit crisis coupled with a post Cold-War security environment mean to the United States? Change! The end of the Cold War combined with budgetary constraints have created an opportunity and necessity

³Ibid., 6.

for change throughout the Department of Defense (DOD). There are very few who would argue against the need for the U.S. to maintain a well equipped and trained military. However, escalating federal deficits have brought about the need for reductions in government spending. Augmented by the collapse of the USSR, formerly the nation's greatest adversary and primary justification for defense appropriations, DOD's budget becomes a realistic target for reduction.

These events will not only reduce the size of the defense budget, but propel an overall reconsideration of the basic organization of DOD. According to Vincent Davis, one of the primary reasons for reorganization is the desire for more efficiency in government, and the elimination of waste and duplication.⁴

James Blackwell and Barry Blechman illustrate this point by indicating that Congress since reorganizing U.S. defense organization in 1947 "has intervened repeatedly (with more than twenty major bills enacted into law) to redirect that organization in ways that would improve its effectiveness and efficiency."⁵ In addition, they argue that "Congress has a constitutional duty to oversee the management of DOD to ensure that the will of the governed is carried out."⁶

⁴Vincent Davis, "The Evolution of Central U.S. Defense Management," in Reorganizing America's Defense, ed. Robert Art, Vincent Davis and Samuel Huntington (Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985), 149-150.

⁵James A. Blackwell Jr., and Barry M. Blechman, Making Defense Reform Work (Brassey's (US),INC., Washington, New York, 1990), 266.

⁶Ibid.

Redundancy and duplication within the Armed Services has once again made its way to the forefront. Sparked by the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), a debate over service roles, missions, and functions has been raised.⁷ Senator Sam Nunn D-GA., SASC Chairman, in a July 2 floor speech entitled, *The Defense Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul The Services Roles And Missions*, argued that our nation can no longer afford interservice rivalry, and that redundancy and duplication in the current allocation of roles and missions is costing billions of dollars each year.⁸

Senator John McCain R-AZ. also called for Chairman Powell and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney "to provide Congress with a 'strong message on roles and missions' of the Services."⁹ There are many, including Senator John Warner R-VA., who feel it "is too much to expect the Pentagon to propose any

⁷The terms "roles, missions, and functions" have been used interchangeably and often times incorrectly throughout this research. For this thesis, as defined by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the terms "roles, missions, and functions have the following meanings: **Roles** are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services were established by Congress in law. **Missions** are the tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to the combatant Commanders in Chief (CINCs). **Functions** are specific responsibilities assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense to enable the Services to fulfill their legally established roles.

⁸Nunn, Sam, "The Defense Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul The Service Roles And Missions," Floor Speech, 2 July 1992.

⁹William Mathews, "On a role: Lawmakers rev up to restructure the military," Army Times, 10 August 1992, 28.

sweeping changes," to service roles and missions.¹⁰ Senator McCain's challenge to Powell is a call to set inter-service rivalry and service parochialism aside, thus, allowing a roles and missions report to be presented that eliminates needless redundancy and duplication. As Senator Nunn indicates, "We must find ways to save billions of dollars with streamlining and eliminating the duplication."¹¹

Section 153(b) of Title 10, United States Code, enacted as part of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, requires the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit to the Secretary of Defense a report containing recommendations for changes in the assignment of roles, missions and functions to the armed forces as the Chairman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the Services. The Chairman in his report is required to address changes in the nature of threats faced by the U.S.; unnecessary duplication of effort among the armed forces; and changes in technology that can be applied effectively to warfare.¹²

In the Chairman's February 1993 report entitled, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces*

¹⁰Rick Maze, "Role review holds up weapons," Army Times, 24 August 1992, 21.

¹¹Mathews, 28.

¹²United States Code, Title 10 Armed Forces, Vol.III, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988.

of the United States, Powell suggest ways to make the military more efficient, but does not call for radically reshaping the four Services. The report has "rebuffed" the type of consolidation that Congress and President Clinton has called for. In addition, the report has been interpreted as "more noteworthy for its objection to the view that Washington should eliminate duplication by realigning the missions of the three military services."¹³ According to Floyd Spence R-SC., ranking republican on the House Armed Services Committee, "For many in congress, there is too much of a status quo in the report, . . ."¹⁴ In Powell's defense, it can be argued that duplication in service roles and missions does provide an additional margin of security.

Indicating General Powell's report represents an important first step, Secretary Of Defense (SecDef) Les Aspin on 30 March 1993 called for a second roles and missions report. A roles and missions report is traditionally produced once every three years. However, a provision does exist to make the report due upon request from the President or Secretary of Defense. Aspin's announcement illustrates the dissatisfaction with the current Powell report for its possible lack of vision, and undoubtedly highlights, what is fast becoming the preeminent defense policy issue of the post-Cold War era.

¹³Michael R. Gordon, "Report By Powell Challenges Calls To Revise Military," New York Times, 31 December 1992, A1.

¹⁴David C. Morrison, "Role Call," National Journal, 20 March 1993, 690.

During his election campaign, President Bill Clinton indicated that he will act quickly in launching a reassessment of service roles and missions. He stated that as President he would call a meeting similar to the 1948 Key West Conference at which the service chiefs set the missions of the Army, Navy Air Force and Marine Corps. Clinton's goal is to have the service chiefs "hammer out a new understanding about consolidating and coordinating military roles and missions in the 1990s and beyond."¹⁵

This thesis will examine the ability of the President, Congress and Armed Services to formulate and implement defense policy that eliminates duplication and inefficiencies within service roles, missions and functions. I will argue that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in conjunction with the four military Services will be unable to formulate any significant changes in their roles missions and functions. The Services inability to make change will force Congress to take the lead in the defense reform effort. However, congressional efforts to formulate and implement defense policy will prove imperfect again, unless Congress can first reform itself. Finally, I will argue that the Executive Branch under the guidance and leadership of Secretary of Defense Les Aspin has the best opportunity to formulate and implement defense policy shaped for a post-Cold War environment.

¹⁵William Mathews, There will be change, 12.

Chapter II begins with a brief overview on the origins of the present day roles and missions debate. This chapter examines the National Security Act of 1947, the 1948 Key West Agreement, the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (GNA). Chapter III examines the process of reform with an inside look at GNA. An understanding of the defense reform process of GNA provides valuable insight as to how legislators might work with or against the President and Services, in reallocating service roles and missions.

Chapter IV lays out the current debate over service roles, missions and functions, and illustrates its importance amidst a declining defense budget. Chapter Five examines the constraints and implications of defense policymaking in regards to the ability of Congress, Services and Executive Branch to realign, consolidate or even abolish service roles and missions. Chapter VI will provide my conclusions.

II. ORIGINS OF THE PRESENT DAY ROLES AND MISSIONS DEBATE

Prior to the development of airplanes, concerns over service roles and missions was limited. The division between land and sea was rather distinct. However, along with the airplane came controversy over its use. The seacoast line had instinctively led to attempts to define an earth-water approach to the problem, but as range and striking power of the airplane increased, so did the problems. What developed was inter-service differences over aircraft procurement based upon interpretation of missions. These difficulties prompted Mr. H. Trubee Davison, Assistant Secretary of War for Air to issue the following 1930 statement:

There is serious duplication between the Army and Navy . . . with reference to land-based aircraft in coast defense. This . . . results in unnecessary expenditures for the national defense and in a confused and therefore inefficient conception of the relative functions of the two services.¹⁶

The theme of Mr. Davison's remark is very similar to today's roles and missions debate against needless redundancy and duplication. The roles and missions as they are currently written today, represent compromises reached over 45 years ago. The compromise, known as the Key West agreement, gave

¹⁶Cited in, Lawrence J. Legere, Jr. "Unification Of The Armed Forces," (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1950), 157.

each service more or less what it wanted, at the price of redundancy, and therefore greater cost.¹⁷

This chapter examines the origins of the present day roles and missions debate. The chapter is divided into five sections, beginning with the National Security Act of 1947. This section serves to illustrate the controversy created over service roles and missions from the need for unification of command. Section B describes the contentious compromise that shaped service roles and missions, that we still live with today. Section C examines the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act that sought centralization of defense management for the purpose of improving the efficiency and economical operation of the Services. Section D examines congressional concerns related to the unification effort from post-WWII to pre-Goldwater-Nichols. The last section looks at the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (GNA). GNA illustrates Congress' attempt to once again reform the Defense Department organizational structure without addressing (as did the other laws) the assignment of service roles and missions.

A. NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

Shortly after World War II senior military and political leaders struggled with lessons learned from the war. The most significant lesson was the need for unification of command. The global nature of the war had emphasized the

¹⁷Morton H. and David Halperin, "The Key West Key," Foreign Policy 53, (Winter 1983-84): 116-117.

importance of having one commander responsible for all assets in a given theater.

In April 1943 a division in Army Service Force was created to begin planning for the post-war period. Their work was highly regarded and within three months the division was constituted as the Special Planning Division (SPD) of the War Department Special Staff. On 3 November 1943, General Marshall submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a memorandum entitled *A Single Department of War in the Post-War Period*. His memorandum was an endorsement of an SPD study that recommended reorganizing the defense establishment into one department with one civilian secretary. In addition, the department would have one chief of staff, one military high command and unified service branches for air, sea and ground warfare.¹⁸

The Navy took exception, finding the plan a challenge to its own existence. In response, the Navy created a buffer recommending working defense matters through agencies and cooperative ventures. The Navy wanted the Services to remain separate, and to cooperate with each other on a range of tasks only.¹⁹

¹⁸Legere, 264-275.

¹⁹General Russel E. Dougherty, USAF, Retired, "ROOTS AND WINGS A PERSPECTIVE ON REORGANIZATION," Air Power Journal (Summer 1992): 8-9.

Debate over the unification of the armed forces ultimately led to the signing of the National Security Act of 1947, also known as the Unification Act. In restructuring, the Unification Act established the Department of Defense headed by a secretary of defense, separated the Air Force from the Army, and gave legal status to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²⁰ The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps retained equivalent degrees of autonomy, and both the Navy and Marines kept their aviation components. The Air Force was the real winner in that it became a separate service on 18 September 1947, the day the act became effective. Because there was compromise there were shortfalls. The act failed to specify which of the Services should be given authority to do what. The Navy strongly urged that each service be given all the forces that would be necessary to carry out its mission independently. In contrast, the Army and Air Force argued that such a move would create unnecessary duplication of forces and that they should work together as a team. Unable to resolve these differences, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal summoned all the joint chiefs to Key West Naval Base in March 1948.²¹

²⁰There were two other key provisions of the Unification Act not associated with the Pentagon: The creation of the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency.

²¹Morton H. David Halperin, "Rewriting The Key West Accord," in Reorganizing America's Defense, ed. Robert J. Art, Vincent Davis and Samuel P. Huntington (Washington: Pergamon Brassey's, 1985, 346.

B. THE 1948 KEY WEST AGREEMENT

Prior to Key West, President Truman attempted to thwart the interservice rivalry that was causing the controversy over roles and missions. He went after the Navy's desire to possess land-based air and naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping. Truman sent a letter to Navy Secretary Forrestal and Secretary of War John Patterson outlining his vision of the roles and missions of the Services. The letter called for the Air Force to maintain land-based planes for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping. Of course, this presidential position sent the Navy through the roof.²²

A similar letter was sent to the Senate and House committees on Military and Naval Affairs. This letter became Executive Order 9877 (EO 9877). The Navy became so openly irritated over the Air Force role that President Truman rescinded his order and told Secretary of Defense Forrestal to issue the 'functions' directive himself.²³ Eight months later, on March 11-14, 1948, Secretary Forrestal took unprecedented action by taking all the Joint Chiefs down to Key West, Florida.²⁴

²²Dougherty, 9.

²³After the unification legislation was passed, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal was made the first Secretary of Defense. Secretary of War John Patterson was Truman's first choice, but he declined.

²⁴Dougherty, 9.

The four-day retreat in Key West produced the now famous Key West agreement. The inter-service treaty negotiated at Key West was entitled "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," and approved by President Truman. The Key West agreement was centered around two subjects: the powers and functions of the JCS and the jurisdictional problem raised by service roles and missions. In regards to the powers and functions of the JCS, the conference agreed:

to emphasize the duty of the Joint Chiefs to provide the Defense Department, as guide lines for the development of its various programs, integrated, or unified, military staff plans, rather than compilations of service oriented plans. This has been described as a shaky compromise at best.²⁵

According to Paul Hammond, this agreement "added little or nothing to the status quo," because this was already an agreed upon objective of the National Security Act of 1947.²⁶

The agreement over the assignment of service roles and missions was nothing more than an endorsement of each individual Services proposal. The JCS, a committee of equals, failed to negotiate among the specific service proposals and even disagreed about correct interpretation before publication.²⁷

²⁵Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 237-238.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷John C. Ries, The Management of Defense: Organization and Control of the U.S. Armed Services. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964) 126.

The outcome of the Key West agreement proved beneficial for the Navy. By retaining the Navy-based Marine Corps and authority to provide close air support for Marine land operations, the Navy retained many of its goals. In addition, the Navy gained the authority to carry out ground launched missions necessary for sea battles. According to David and Morton Halperin, the Army and the Air Force were willing to give the Navy control over almost all sea operations in order to avoid excessive duplication. The Army and the Air Force agreed to cooperate with each other as a team on joint missions. For example, the Air Force pledged to provide the Army with airlift and close air support.²⁸

Although Key West set up a basic structure of responsibilities and missions, interservice disputes did not stop. Each service had its own programs to protect and didn't want to waste valuable budget dollars and resources on programs designed to aid the other Services. Airlift, sealift and close air support (CAS) provide good examples for the Army. Both the Navy and the Air Force neglected their responsibilities to the Army in order to concentrate on sea control and nuclear strike, the preeminent mission in the era of the Eisenhower Administration.²⁹

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid., 349.

C. THE DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1958

On 18 November 1952, Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett sent President Eisenhower a letter on service organization. He concluded in his letter that service organizational structure was unacceptable and unworkable. Lovett recommended to Eisenhower that a thorough functional and organizational study of DOD take place.³⁰

President Eisenhower was well aware of the existing problems between the services and in 1952 he convened the Rockefeller Commission to study Defense Department operations and make recommendations for improvement. The report of the commission stressed the need for strengthened civilian control, improved strategic planning, and effectiveness with the economy.³¹ In early 1958, Eisenhower sent Congress a message conveying the concept of truly unifying the operational commands. He stressed that each unified commander must have unquestioned authority over all units of the command. President Eisenhower concluded his message by stating:

I recommend, therefore, that present law, including certain restrictions relating to combatant functions, be so amended as to remove any possible obstacles to the full unity of our commands and the full command over them by unified commanders.³²

³⁰Dougherty, 10

³¹John C Ries, 150-151.

³²Dougherty, 10.

President Eisenhower followed with a draft bill recommending his philosophy. Despite the raging dispute that ensued, most of Eisenhower's recommendations became law.³³

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 had one other significant dimension. It gave the Defense Secretary the statutory authority he needed to exert centralized control over the Services through the budgetary process. While not providing for an actual merger of the armed forces, the 1958 Act gave the Defense Secretary the power to take any steps he deemed necessary to improve the efficiency and economical operation of the Defense Department, including authority enabling "... the transfer, reassignment, abolition, and consolidation of functions" of the Services.³⁴ Armed with this statutory authority and the management techniques of program budgeting, it became the goal of the Secretary of Defense to end inter-service rivalry and parochialism.³⁵

³³Ibid.

³⁴Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, Public Law 85-599 (85th Congress) : sec. 3(c) (1).

³⁵Robert McNamara became the first Secretary of Defense to use the statutory authority provided by the 1958 Act to exert centralized control over the services through the budgetary process. The Tactical Fighter, Experimental (TFX) decision was McNamara's first opportunity to do so. McNamara's story is beyond the purview of this paper. However, Robert J. Art offers an excellent account in *The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military* (Little, Brown and Company, 1968).

D. LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS

Congressional involvement throughout post-WWII reorganization efforts has centered around a very unique characteristic: Congress' concern over the powers of the Secretary of Defense. Specifically, the secretaries authority to determine the roles and missions of the Services. Although Congress traditionally has resisted attempts to centralize the Defense Department, they have consistently given in to executive pressures to do so. However, with one exception, the matter of service roles and missions.³⁶

In the development of the 1947 National Security Act, the concern of service roles and missions became a major issue of unification. The two competing philosophies at the time was either to merge the Services or preserve the military departments as separate and independent agencies. The problem Congress saw with a merger of the Services was the plan to have the director of the merged forces assign roles and missions to the Services. On the other hand, the Navy plan to maintain separate Services defeated a major objective of unification: the elimination of needless duplication. John Ries best explains Congress' dilemma:

The roles and missions issue was not simply a matter of administrative centralization or decentralization. It was a problem of legislative-executive relations. If Congress permitted any executive officer to reallocate or restrict service roles and missions, it would be delegating him some of its own prerogatives. But if Congress did not allow an executive officer to

³⁶Ries, 95-187.

consolidate or reassign service functions, its prerogatives would be preserved, but existing duplication would be perpetuated.³⁷

Congress resolved its dilemma by writing a preamble to the National Security Act. The preamble provided for the continued existence of the three services, including the Marine Corps and naval aviation, and their assigned functions. In addition, Congress agreed to the promulgation of an executive order, which allocated functions in greater detail.³⁸ This was the beginning of many contentious debates between Congress and the Executive Branch regarding authority over the assignment of roles and missions to the services.

Less than two years later, Congress with some resistance, amended the National Security Act favorably to the type of organization the Secretary of Defense wanted. The 1949 Amendments, most notably, eliminated the service secretaries from the National Security Council and added a non-voting chairman to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The goal of these changes were to deny the Services a direct role in defense policymaking. Although Congress created the type of organization the secretary wanted, "it did not intend to lose its own prerogatives in the process."³⁹ According to the Executive Branch, policymaking was the prerogative of the President and Congress. Ries makes

³⁷Ibid., 96.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Ibid., 141.

the point that although Congress might agree, "it also realized its own need for access to the Services to makes its policy function meaningful."⁴⁰

Ries argues that Congress needs to hear disagreement and controversy from the Services, because disagreement means alternatives. Examining and judging alternatives equates to congressional control. Ries states,

Congress took its constitutional mandate to provide for the common defense very seriously. If the secretary successfully eliminated inter-service rivalry and secured agreement within the department, Congress would be reduced to accepting whatever the secretary recommended.⁴¹

Congress was not going to accept this course of action under any circumstances. Congress followed the premise that "policy can be put to no valid test beyond the agreement of those charged with the responsibility for executing it."⁴² Congress wanted to be sure that the Services had the opportunity to express their view in the defense policymaking process.

The 1958 Defense Reorganization Act once again saw Congress faced with the request to allow the Secretary of Defense greater authority to determine service roles and missions. Congress was incensed at the proposal to reduce its role in this area. Congress' main concern under the new proposals was its inability to prevent an undesirable action of the secretary. Congress would have to pass a law to prevent any action, and laws are subject to veto.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Ibid., 141-142.

⁴²Ibid.

According to Carl Vinson Chairman House Armed Services Committee, "If service roles and missions were removed from law and made subject to executive determination, little would remain for Congress except to appropriate funds."⁴³

The argument the secretary put forth in calling for greater power over service roles and missions, was to develop "truly unified" combatant commands. Congressional hearings witnessed numerous testimonies insisting upon this power, but "no illustration of this need were provided."⁴⁴ Congress began to sense another use to which the power might be used. Congress believed that the administration wanted the power to change the three Services rather than develop "truly unified" commands. After intense congressional questioning of administration officials, Congress concluded that despite the denial of any inappropriate use of increased secretarial power, the possibility did exist for an alteration of the Services for reasons other than to develop unity in combatant commands. Ries offers an excellent summary of this debate:

Whatever the true motives of the administration in requesting such a broad grant for power from Congress, the manner in which the request was justified and the lack of restrictions surrounding the proposed authorization antagonized Congress. As might be suspected, Congress, in the final working of the reorganization bill, insured its participation. It

⁴³Carl Vinson, cited in Ries, 174.

⁴⁴Ibid., 175.

provided for congressional veto of any proposed alteration of combatant functions by the passage of a disapproving resolution in either House.⁴⁵

The post-WWII defense reorganization effort, that has sought unification and the elimination of duplication and inefficiencies, has been characterized by the Executive Branch's drive for greater centralization and Congress' attempts to draw the line beyond which centralization is not to go. The result has led to a greater centralization of the Defense Department. However, it can be argued that congressional limitations over the control of service roles, missions and functions, have compounded interservice rivalry and therefore has led to the duplication and inefficiencies that exist today.

E. THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 1986

Although the 1958 Act provided positive legislation towards unification, many in the Services were slow to fully appreciate or even understand the changes in command relationships. General Russell E. Dougherty, USAF, Retired, argued that the Services failed to pay much attention to the unified and specified command structure. He indicated that the service chiefs ran their forces through the service component commands without much CINC involvement. It was his observation that, "by and large, we lived with some fragments of this arrangement for the next 27-plus years until 1986."⁴⁶

⁴⁵Ibid., 177.

⁴⁶Dougherty, 11.

Failures of the military to coordinate operations during the Vietnam conflict, the Iranian rescue mission, the attempt to develop a sea-based MX, and the 1983 invasion of Grenada, are but a few examples that led Congress to once again focus upon reforming the Defense Department organizational structure.⁴⁷ In the words of former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger:

. . . in the absence of structural reform . . . I feel the United States will obtain neither the best military advice, nor the effective execution of military plans, nor the provision of military capabilities commensurate with the fiscal resources provided, nor the most advantageous deterrence and defense posture available to the nation.⁴⁸

The 1986 Goldwater - Nichols Act provided changes in the Unified and Specified command structure designed to increase the input of the commanders into the process of developing budgetary and force structure priorities. The goal with this change is to redirect funding into vital areas traditionally ignored by the individual Services, such as airlift and sealift. A second area of major change mandated by GNA concerns the role of the Joint Staff. Instead of working for the JCS as a corporate body, the Joint Staff is now to work solely for the Chairman. This change was designed to prevent officers with parochial concerns from exerting undue influence over subordinates. Among the most highly publicized, and certainly the most controversial of the changes in the defense organizational structure mandated by GNA, are those which

⁴⁷Halperin, 344-358.

⁴⁸U.S., Congress, Senate, Defense Organization: The Need for Change, Staff Report to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 99th Congress: III.

affect the roles and authority of the JCS. Basically, the powers of the JCS Chairman were increased significantly by giving him an independent voice.⁴⁹ The intent of Congress was to allow the Chairman to over rule the opinions of the parochial service chiefs:

The fundamental purpose of this bill is to refine the role of the chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. The bill would enable the chairman . . . to transcend the service-orientation of the respective service chiefs to provide clear-cut, objective military advice to the national command authorities.⁵⁰

Goldwater - Nichols has been acclaimed as successful legislation. However, it still failed (as did the other laws) to address the assignment of roles and missions of the military departments.⁵¹

In conclusion, this chapter has sought to illustrate the origins of the present day roles and missions debate. The development of the airplane led to inter-service differences over aircraft procurement based upon interpretation of missions. These difficulties created an inefficient conception of the relative functions between the Services. The redundancy and duplication that resulted, illustrate the very core of today's roles and missions debate.

The attempt to resolve the issue of roles and missions resulted in a compromise that was nothing more than an endorsement of each individual

⁴⁹Goldwater - Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433 (100 Stat. 992-1000), 99th Congress: sec. 402.

⁵⁰U.S., Congress, House, Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1985, Report from the House Committee on Armed Services to Accompany H.R. 3622, (Report 99-375, 99th Congress: 2.

⁵¹Nunn, Floor Speech, 2.

Services proposal. The compromise, known as the Key West agreement, gave each service more or less what it wanted, at the price of redundancy, and therefore greater cost. Although Key West set up a basic structure of responsibilities and missions, inter-service disputes did not stop. In order to protect valuable budget dollars for individual programs, each service neglected secondary missions designed to support one another.

In a quest to improve the efficiency of the Services, the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act was passed giving the Secretary of Defense the statutory authority to exert centralized control over the Services through the budgetary process. It was his goal to bring an end to inter-service rivalry and parochialism, therefore duplication and inefficiencies. However, the problem that stood in his way was Congress. Congressional limitations placed upon the Executive Branch were legislated to insure the continued existence of the Services, and for that matter naval aviation. Congress was not going to usurp what it saw as its constitutional duty to provide for the common defense.

Failures of the military to coordinate operations prompted Congress to pursue further defense reorganization. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act basically sought to refine the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the hope of eliminating inter-service logrolling and producing sound military advice to the national command authorities. Although GNA has been labeled the most significant defense reorganization effort since the 1947

National Security Act, it still failed to address the assignment of service roles and missions.

III. THE PROCESS OF REFORM: AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 1986

With changes in U.S. forces and defense policies inevitable, how might the President, Congress and the Armed Services carry out the reallocation of service roles and missions? In the study of this question, it is necessary to look at past defense reorganization. This chapter examines how and why the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (GNA) came about. An understanding of the defense reform process of GNA provides valuable insight as to how legislators might work with or against the President and Services in reallocating service roles and missions.

There is a unique similarity between GNA and the current roles and missions debate. Both defense policy initiatives were spurred by congressional activism. This has important implications for the Executive Branch and Services in regards to future defense reform. Congressional activism implies that the Executive Branch and/or Services must be proactive in responding to the demand for change, or take what the Congress mandates. Those involved in the policymaking arena within the Services and Executive Branch should be asking the question: How can the Services and or Executive Branch present sound defensible suggestions for change that preempt Congress' attempt to

formulate overall defense policy?⁵² This concept will be further developed in chapter five.

The campaign that ultimately led to the passage of GNA on 1 October 1986, began in a hearing before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) on 3 February, 1982, with the testimony by General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff, over concerns about basic shortcomings in the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Jones' fundamental argument was that the current JCS organization "tended to evolve policy by compromises that accommodated the bureaucratic interests of the individual Services."⁵³

His announcement came as a surprise to many, since it came from a uniformed officer and someone from inside the system. General Jones offered the following justification for his actions:

Although I recognize the very strong and persistent headwinds, I could not leave office in good conscience this summer without making a major effort to illuminate the real issues once more and hopefully wrest some substantial changes. Most of the problems and some of the approaches I will address have been discovered-then reburied-many times in the past 35 years. The difference this time is that the proposals for improvement are coming from someone inside the system, who has been in the best

⁵²Paul Stockton offers an excellent discussion on how "policy vacuums" influence congressional behavior in "CONGRESS AND DEFENSE POLICYMAKING FOR THE POST-COLD WAR ERA," to be published in James M. Lindsay and Randall Ripley, EDS., Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy On Capitol Hill, (Ann Arbor: University Of Michigan Press, 1993)

⁵³Pat Towell, "Gen. Jones Asked changes: House Bill Would Strengthen Joint Chiefs Chairman's Role," Congressional Quarterly (28 August 1982): 2132.

position to understand the causes and consequences of its shortcomings.⁵⁴

Jones made it clear that the problem was not with individuals, but was an organizational one. He concluded, as an observer and participant in joint activities for over 20 years, and having witnessed six different chairmen and dozens of service chiefs, that the basic problems have continued regardless of who was in office. As a minimum, Jones recommended changes in three specific areas: (1) Strengthen the role of the chairman. (2) Limit Service staff involvement in the joint process. (3) Broaden the training, experience, and rewards for joint duty.⁵⁵

Army Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Meyer, joined Jones in criticizing the JCS structure and suggested that he had not gone far enough in his recommendations for change.⁵⁶ Meyer offered his own proposals. Coupled with those from Jones, this effect led to HASC Investigations Subcommittee hearings on JCS reorganization beginning April 21, 1982. Testimony was received from over 40 witnesses. Results of the subcommittee uncovered near

⁵⁴David C. Jones, General, USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change," armed forces Journal international 119 (March 1982): 62.

⁵⁵Ibid., 68-72.

⁵⁶Edward C. Meyer, General USA, Chief of Staff, United States Army, "The JCS-How Much Reform Is needed?" armed forces Journal international 120 (April 1982): 82.

unanimous agreement that organizational problems existed and were affecting JCS and Joint Staff performance.

The House Armed Services Committee responded by producing HR 6954, sponsored by Investigations Subcommittee Chairman Richard C. White, D-Texas. The bill authorized the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to provide his own personal military advice to the President and Secretary of Defense. In addition, HR 6954 created the post of deputy chairman, to be filled by a full admiral or full general from the service other than the chairman's. The overall intent of the bill was to suppress the parochial interests of the individual Services, by increasing the power of the CJCS. The bill did fail to include one of Jone's recommendations to curb the influence of the service staffs in Joint Chiefs' deliberations.⁵⁷ The decision to allow the service chiefs to maintain their dual responsibility parallels the same concerns Congress had in pre-GNA reorganization efforts. As was mentioned in Chapter II, Congress wanted to be sure that the Services had the opportunity to express their views concerning resource allocation, roles and missions, and doctrine.

The House passed HR 6954 by voice vote on 16 August 1982. However, not without reservations. HASC acknowledged concern over the concept of shifting the balance of bureaucratic power from the Services to the Chairman

⁵⁷U.S., Congress, House, Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1985, Report from the House Committee on Armed Services to Accompany H.R. 3622, (Report 99-375), 99th Congress.

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, Chairman White indicated "the committee was not prepared to conclude that the JCS system was 'fatally flawed' because of the dual responsibilities of the service chiefs."⁵⁸ Chairman White, indicated that the goal of the bill was intended more to stimulate further reforms within the Pentagon not requiring legislation. HR 6954 died at the end of the 97th Congress for the lack of Senate Action.⁵⁹

Congress' inaction on HR 6954 may have marked the end of the first stage in the development of GNA, but it also marked the beginning of growing opposition to the idea of defense reorganization. Increasing the JCS chairman's power at the expense of the services created momentous opposition from within DOD. Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) was in full disagreement with all of Jones' proposals. Hayward illustrated his resentment to reorganization by indicating he was

deeply offended by the slanderous criticisms which one frequently hears about the Joint Chiefs being an ineffective group of parochial service chiefs who spend most of their time bickering among themselves, horsetrading to preserve their turf and what is best for their service.⁶⁰

Marine Commandant General Robert H. Barrow was also in disagreement with Jones' proposals, warning that they would harm the system by preventing

⁵⁸Towell, 2133.

⁵⁹Pat Towell, "Reagan Administration Opposes Measure: House Votes Increased Role For Chairman of Joint Chiefs," Congressional Quarterly, (22 october 1983), 2166.

⁶⁰Admiral Thomas B. Hayward cited in Pat Towell, "Gen. Jones Asked Changes," 2133.

the development of alternatives that should be presented to civilian authority.⁶¹

Opposition to defense reorganization did not stop with the Services. The Reagan Administration made its opposition known with the 17 October 1983 passage of HR 3718. HR 3718 was a continuation of the previous year's HR 6954. It too sought an increase in stature for the Chairman of JCS as an independent military counsel to the President. HASC intentions while drafting the bill was hopefully to boost military advice to a level that would provide more impact on national decision making. However, the bill was not perceived in that manner. The Reagan administration, via William H. Taft IV, argued that the existing system had served the nation well and there was no need for change. He also warned of the lack of civilian control over the military that might result from any such legislation.⁶²

Although HR 3718 died due to Senate inaction, great strides were made in June 1983. The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) began to look at decision making in DOD. An investigation much broader in scope than the House committee's inquiry into JCS reform began with 12 hearings and 31 witnesses. Much credit was given to SASC Chairman John Tower R-Texas, and

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Towell, "Reagan Administration Opposes Measure," 2166.

ranking minority member Scoop Jackson D-Washington, for this undertaking.⁶³

Giving credit to SASC Chairman Tower proved rather ironic. It was not until Senator Barry Goldwater R-Arizona succeeded Tower as Chairman of SASC in 1985 that any serious talk of defense reorganization took place. Under Tower, SASC hearings were held, but no bills were acted on. Proponents of change argued that SASC's inaction was due in part to Tower's opposition. The case can be made that Tower was receptive to the Navy viewpoint against elements of reorganization, having been influenced as a member of the Navy Reserve.⁶⁴

Goldwater succeeding Tower in 1985 marked the beginning of a second stage in the process of reform. A congressional surge began to take form. After nearly four years of attempted reform by the House, four separate bills were introduced in August 1985. HR 2265, sponsored by subcommittee Chairman Bill Nichols, D-Alabama, contained provisions of the previous bill HR 3718. HR 2165 (Ike Skelton, D-Missouri), and HR 2710 (full committee Chairman Les Aspin, D-Wisconsin), established the JCS chairman as the principal military advisor, but differed in other particulars. HR 2314 also

⁶³Congress, Senate, Senator Goldwater of Arizona speaking on the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 99th Congress., Congressional Record (7 May 1986), S5463-4.

⁶⁴Pat Towell, "Revamping the Pentagon's 'Corporate Board'," Congressional Quarterly, (August 24, 1985), 1679.

sponsored by Skelton, would have abolished the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Staff in favor of a centralized staff headed by a chief of staff to the President and Secretary of Defense.⁶⁵

In addition to the House bills, Senator Goldwater and SASC senior committee Democrat, Sam Nunn, initiated under their co-chairmanship a nine-member task force to study defense organizational issues. They also initiated a more vigorous study effort of a staff study on organization and decision-making procedures of DOD.⁶⁶ Nunn's aggressiveness with defense reorganization was illustrated when he allotted the issue SASC's highest priority for 1985 and as much time as needed in 1986.⁶⁷ Goldwater, from the time he took over chairmanship of SASC, announced repeatedly that defense reorganization would be his number one priority for the remainder of his Senate career.⁶⁸

With activism on the rise in the Senate and House, Pentagon opposition was on the rise as well. The passage of HR 3622 was a House compromise

⁶⁵U.S., Congress, House, "Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1985, Report from the House Committee on Armed Services to Accompany H.R. 3622," (Report 99-375), 99th Congress, 5.

⁶⁶U.S., Congress, Senate, "Defense Reorganization: The need for change, Staff Report to the Senate Armed Services Committee," 99th Congress, III.

⁶⁷Towell, 1680.

⁶⁸Pat Towell, "Stiff Opposition From Defense Officials: Pentagon Reorganization Bill Approved by Goldwater Panel," Congressional Quarterly, (8 March 1986): 572.

based on the four earlier House bills. The bill basically sought to give civilian policy makers a better opportunity to hear military advice free of parochial interest. Defense Secretary Casper W. Weinberger and Navy Secretary John F. Lehman Jr., both testified against any reorganization attempts as unnecessary. Lehman, testifying before HASC subcommittee, aggressively attacked Congress with the following charge:

I think the problem in Defense, and in each of the issues that you have been addressing these last years, starts with Congress. I think that Congress is failing today, as an institution, to carry out the responsibilities that were laid upon it by the Founding Fathers in the Constitution.⁶⁹

Lehman predicated his attack to the proposal of a bureaucratic solution and the further centralization of DOD, that has been the very cause of the dysfunctions being focused upon. He warned the subcommittee panel that if Congress anointed the chairman as an independent source of unified and ostensibly bias-free advice, he might become the sole source of military advice. Lehman argued, "What Secretary of Defense, no matter how highly regarded, no matter how well qualified, can stand against a unified military with one point of view?"⁷⁰

⁶⁹Congress, House, Subcommittee on Investigations, Reorganization Proposals for The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Statement of Honorable John F. Lehman Jr. SecNav, HASC 99-10, 26 June 1985, H201-31.4: 191.

⁷⁰Ibid., 195.

Centralization versus decentralization was the fundamental dividing line between Congress' aggressive drive towards reorganization and Weinberger and Lehman's opposition. The management philosophy of Secretary of Defense Weinberger was characterized as a decentralized approach. He gave Service Secretaries full authority to carry out policy without micromanagement or meddling from intermediate levels.⁷¹

Traditionally, Congress has preferred decentralized rather than centralized control in DOD. Decentralization has allowed Congress to maximize leverage in directing the allocation of resources and determine the outcome of policy disputes.⁷² William Lucas and Raymond Dawson illustrate the point:

Congress has an interest in a considerable measure of service autonomy.... It is significant that, starting with the 86th Congress in 1959, successive Congresses either enacted or considered the enactment of new requirements for annual authorization legislation in all major areas of weapons procurement and military research and development. The intent of these changes was clear: to reduce the area of discretionary power of OSD and to strengthen legislative control of programs. Congress, like the services, appeared to feel threatened by the growing power of OSD over all aspects of defense policy. Congress joined with the armed services in resisting a historic redistribution of power in the Pentagon.⁷³

⁷¹Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Service Committee, Organization Structure and Procedures of the DOD, Statement of Secretary John Lehman, Secretary Of The Navy, 98-1, S201-26.1, 2 November 1983: 221.

⁷²U.S., Congress, Senate, "Defense Organization: The Need for Change, Staff Report to the Senate Armed Services Committee," 99th Congress, 586-588.

⁷³William A. Lucas and Raymond H. Dawson, The Organizational Politics of Defense, (International Studies Association, 1974), 120.

The question is then raised, Why did Congress pursue reorganization that sought to centralize DOD, when it defied their very own divide and conquer strategy?

Part of the answer came in a 645 page SASC Staff Report directed by James R. Locher III. The Senate study urged Pentagon reorganization. It diagnosed the key problems of concern to Congress. The report identified that parochial viewpoints of the Services impeded the military's preparation for war and the quality of its advice to civilian leaders. It blamed poor interservice coordination for the failure of the Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980 and the shortcomings in the 1983 invasion of Grenada.⁷⁴ In addition, the terrorist bombing of the marine barracks in Lebanon that resulted in 241 deaths produced severe criticism of Pentagon organization.

The remaining part of the answer is found in an assessment by Pat Towell. Towell reports that support for reorganization stemmed from congressional "unhappiness rooted in the sheer size of Reagan's defense budgets and the concomitant efforts to slash popular domestic programs."⁷⁵ There was also widespread congressional belief that Weinberger and Reagan had very little grasp on many defense issues. Another factor was Weinberger's limited political support due to widely publicized cases of costly weapon

⁷⁴U.S., Congress, Senate, Defense Reorganization: The Need For Change.

⁷⁵Pat Towell, "Senate Backs Major Changes In Organization Of Pentagon," Congressional Quarterly, (May 10, 1986), 1031.

systems that failed critical tests and miscellaneous items such as toilet seats costing \$640 dollars. According to Towell, "Weinberger's influence on Capitol Hill had reached such a low ebb that his opposition to certain proposals may have increased the margin of congressional support for change."⁷⁶

With the release of the SASC Staff Report and an intense publicity campaign by Goldwater and Nunn, Pentagon opposition softened. Weinberger, in a December 2nd letter to SASC Chairman Goldwater, agreed in general terms to support various measures in the defense reorganization bill. As Representative Bill Nichols D-Alabama, indicated: "The Secretary saw the handwriting on the wall."⁷⁷

In an effort to forestall the growing criticism of DOD, President Reagan in June 1985 appointed a Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management to examine progress already made in improving the management, organization, and decision-making procedures of DOD and propose further changes if needed. He assigned David Packard, a former Deputy Secretary of Defense, to head the commission. The Packard Commission proved to be the final boost for proponents of reorganization. The Commission spelled out criticism of the

⁷⁶Pat Towell, "Parochial Interests at Issue: House Approves Bill to Boost Role of Joint Chiefs Chairman," Congressional Quarterly, (November 23, 1985), 2437.

⁷⁷Bill Nichols cited in Pat Towell, "Weinberger Retreats on Joint Chiefs Reform," Congressional Quarterly, (December 7, 1985), 2570.

current DOD policy, however, in less harsh terms than congressional critics.

The Commission stated:

There is a need for more and better long-range planning to bring together the nation's security objectives, the forces needed to achieve them, and the resources available to support those forces. It is critically important that this relationship be clearly established through a national military strategy.⁷⁸

In 1986, SASC began hearings on the basis of its own staff report, the Packard Commission and an independent review entitled, *Toward a more Effective Defense: The Final Report of the CSIS Defense Organization Project*. Although there were many close votes on specific issues, illustrated by 14 mark-up sessions and 80 written amendments, the Senate voted unanimously 95-0 on S 2295 (Senate's version of HR 3622).⁷⁹

On 12 September 1986, a House and Senate conference produced a compromised version of HR 3622. The Senate approved the conference report by voice vote September 16 and the House likewise September 17. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act became law on 1 October 1986.

⁷⁸Packard Commission, "A Quest for Excellence: Final Report to the President by the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management," (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 10.

⁷⁹Congress, Senate, Senator Goldwater speaking on the Department Of Defense Reorganization Act Of 1986, 99th Congress," Congressional Record (7 May 1986), S5464.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act, which proposed full-scale reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military command system, and the structure of the Department of Defense, had two overriding purposes. The first main objective of the bill was to ensure that national interests, as opposed to the parochial interests of the individual Services, received full weight in top-level deliberations in the Defense Department. The second objective sought to increase the role of the CINCs to ensure that they have a voice in budgetary and policy debates.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act culminated four and a half years of congressional determinism despite analysts like Robert J. Art, who argue that Congress looks "mostly at the details of defense spending, but rarely at the big picture."⁸⁰ I conclude that two critical factors stand out as to why Congress was successful in the reform process: first, SASC's predilection for consensus-building under the leadership of Senator Goldwater and Senator Nunn, and second, President Reagan's choice not to invoke his authority as commander in chief and his formidable political assets to seriously challenge the advocates of change. With Weinberger the strongest opponent during the reform process, President Reagan invested no political capital in his battle against congressional critics.

⁸⁰Robert J. Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget: Enhancing Policy Oversight," in Reorganizing America's Defense, ed. Art, Vincent Davis and Samuel P. Huntington (Washington, DC: Pergamons-Brassey's), 405.

IV. DEALING WITH THE GORDIAN KNOT OF REFORM

Senator Sam Nunn's July 2, 1992 floor speech entitled, *The Defense Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul The Services Roles And Missions*, marked the beginning of what has become the roles and missions debate of the Post-Cold War Era. As with previous roles and missions debates, how the Executive Branch, Congress and Services responded to the demands of change determined any realignment, consolidation or even abolishment of service roles and missions.

Traditionally, interservice rivalry has dominated debates involving service roles and missions. This is true in the sense that conflict over roles and missions is a function of fluctuating defense budgets. When resources are plentiful, duplicative functions proliferate. In this regard, interservice conflict is minimal because services are not pressed by encroachments of another to charge waste or duplication. In the early 1960's, when the Air Force was faced with losing strategic bombers to missiles and counterinsurgency (COIN) was a growth industry, the Air Force set up a COIN activity of their own. Until this time, COIN warfare had been an Army function only. Without Army resistance, the Air Force was successful in its establishment of a flying role in

COIN warfare. The Army was tolerant because its resources were not jeopardized as the result of duplication.⁸¹

With decreasing budgets, conflict arises over requests for dollars and subsequent debates about duplicative functions. According to Lucas and Dawson, "In time of economic entrenchment, departments will agree that costs need to be cut, but they are unlikely to feel the bulk of savings should be found in their own budget."⁸² Conflict arises when the following questions are asked: Who is best qualified to do what or what is most efficiently and properly done by whom? Once a service feels threatened that it may lose funds over a duplicative function, the service will be compelled to attack the effectiveness of the other Services. During a time of reduced defense spending, the fierce Navy-Air Force conflict over the B-36s and super-carriers, illustrates the interservice conflict that ensues when two competing programs are placed head to head.⁸³

This chapter will examine the current roles and missions debate from three separate perspectives. The first perspective is that of Congress. This section will discuss the congressional response to the current debate and will identify the specific areas that Congress has identified as having substantial

⁸¹William A. Lucas and Raymond H. Dawson, 40-41.

⁸²Ibid., 44.

⁸³Ibid., 44-45.

duplication. The second perspective is that of the military. This section will focus on their response to Congress' call for a "no-holds-barred, everything-on-the-table review of the current assignments of roles and missions among the military Services."⁸⁴ The final perspective is that of the Executive Branch. This section discusses the Clinton administration's response to the current roles and missions debate.

A. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE

Senator Nunn's actions on the Senate floor in July of 92, was a mandate for interservice debate over roles and missions. In Nunn's concluding remarks he indicated:

I hope that we can initiate a process to help stimulate the kind of far-reaching review that our times demand. As I mentioned earlier, my intention is to stimulate and facilitate General Powell's and the Department's efforts in this difficult task. It is far better for the Department to accomplish this review. . . . I welcome ideas and debate to help produce the constructive and bipartisan reform that was the hallmark of Goldwater-Nichols.⁸⁵

The essence of Nunn's mandate is his fear that a failure to eliminate needless duplication and inefficiencies within the Services will lead to a "diminished" military capability.⁸⁶ Nunn argued that Congress and DOD must take advantage of the historic events that have brought about the post-

⁸⁴Nunn, Floor Speech, 7.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, 17-18.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*

Cold War environment. Nunn stressed that changing security requirements, technological opportunities and budget imperatives, have created the need for change.

In his speech, Nunn, lauded the Air Force, in contrast to the other Services, for doing a better job in its reorganization of management and administrative structures. Nunn indicates the Army and Navy are doing a good job with downsizing their respective forces, but are way behind the Air Force in this regard. Nunn's real concern, however, is not how fast the Services are downsizing, but how they are downsizing. He stated, ". . . There are virtually no major changes that cross service lines. For all practical purposes, each service is designing its own smaller future."⁸⁷ Nunn's concern is best illustrated by Admiral Crowe, who explained:

At every point in our history as a country, when we have faced the end of a period of military crisis and the start of an era of relative peace, we deal with our defense policy in a two-step process. The first step is to cut the defense budget. And when we do that we usually get a smaller version of what we currently have. The second step is to shape a new force in light of the changed circumstances. We have always tended to do the first step and failed to follow through with the second. This is why Admirals and Generals are usually prepared to fight the last war. It isn't their fault, because the Defense Department only gives them a smaller version of what they had in the last war.⁸⁸

The message Nunn is conveying, by charging that the Services are designing their own smaller future irrespective of redundancy and duplication

⁸⁷Ibid., 6.

⁸⁸Crow cited in Nunn, Floor Speech, 6.

across service lines, coupled with his mandate for an interservice debate over roles and missions, takes on several meanings. First, Congress will not tolerate nor allow what Admiral Crowe indicates as a smaller version of what we currently have. A failure to reverse this trend can certainly lead to the feared hollow force, that the U.S. has so painstakingly tried to avoid, yet so painfully experienced. Second, Congress has demanded that the Services under the leadership of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff produce the needed changes that will eliminate duplication and inefficiencies within service roles and missions. Whether consolidation, realignment or abolishment, Nunn indicates that it is far better for DOD to accomplish such tasks.

Finally, Nunn's speech sends an important, but obscure message for DOD and the Executive Branch. Congress' role in defense policymaking should not be misunderstood. Blechman articulates Nunn's message with his view that the days when Congress played the role "of a relatively minor actor, frequently outspoken but only sporadically consulted, rarely involved in actual decision making and never in policy execution" is over.⁸⁹ The congressional activism that brought Goldwater-Nichols (GNA) to fruition is an example of the role Congress will take in future defense policymaking. This assessment raises the question, If DOD balks at eliminating duplication and inefficiencies in its roles

⁸⁹Barry M. Blechman, "The New Congressional Role in Arms Control," in A Question Of Balance: The President, The Congress, and Foreign Policy, ed. Thomas E. Mann (The Brookings Institution, 1990), 109-110.

and missions, how capable will Congress be in handling defense policy formulation and implementation? Unlike GNA, roles and missions reorganization is tied to defense spending programs that provide jobs for constituents, and therefore has re-election incentives. Chapter V will further discuss the implications that Congress might experience in their quest for defense restructuring.

Senator Nunn does provide a non-prescriptive framework for reform. He describes nineteen areas that contain substantial duplication and that have the potential for streamlining. It is not the goal of this thesis to get into the specifics of each category, nor make recommendations for additions or deletions. The following list is provided to illustrate the enormous impact, controversy, and sensitivity that exist within a roles and missions debate.

- projection of air power
- land-based vs. sea-based power projection
- duplicative multirole fighter capability
- duplication between Marine Corps and Navy
- parallel electronic jammer aircraft fleets
- contingency or expeditionary ground forces, duplicative infantry divisions
- Army tank and MLRS battalions for Marine Corps
- theater air defenses
- space operations
- helicopter forces and training

- intelligence
- pilot training
- aerial refueling
- electronic surveillance
- consolidate Medical Corps, Chaplains Corps and Legal Departments
- logistics and support activities
- administrative and management headquarters
- unified combatant command headquarters
- National Guard and Reserve component forces

This list also serves as an explanation as to why roles and missions have gone unchanged since the Key West Agreement. Congress has a significant battle if they are to achieve the elimination of duplication and inefficiencies that have been labeled a problem "too hard" to solve?⁹⁰

Senator Nunn hasn't been the lone Congressman in the pursuit to eliminate duplication and inefficiencies within the Services. Nunn's efforts have been endorsed by Senator John Warner R-Virginia. Warner, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) ranking republican, supports the initiative to reorganize roles and missions and is very direct in how it will be carried out. He states:

It is exceedingly difficult, no matter how strong a secretary of defense may be or a chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, for them to put the final

⁹⁰General David Jones cited in Nunn, Floor Speech, 3.

framework on an armed force which must then go forward for a number of years in that configuration, . . . I predict that the end result will be one that is primarily determined by the Congress.⁹¹

House Armed Services Committee Chairman, Rep Ronald Dellums (D-California), has been outspoken as well. In regards to Clinton's initial military spending plan of 263 billion, Dellums accused Les Aspin of presenting a budget that was too close to one he had inherited from former Secretary Of Defense, Dick Cheney. Dellums fundamental argument is that there is a significant cost in delaying year after year the inevitable adjustment to the post-Cold War era.⁹²

Critics of major reorganization include Senator John McCain, R-Arizona. Although McCain supported a roles and missions review by Collin Powell, he stated, "it would be a mistake to expect it to endorse wholesale changes. . . . the United States should avoid mistakes made by the British."⁹³ What McCain was referring to was the Falkland Islands war in 1982, whereby British forces suffered from previous military reductions.

In anticipation of Chairman Powell's roles and missions report, Congress put the pressure on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Colin Powell to produce revolutionary changes that recommended eliminating costly

⁹¹Rick Maze, "Role review holds up weapons," Army Times, 24 August 1992: 21.

⁹²Eric Schmitt, Lawmakers Are Impatient to Start Pentagon Cuts," The New York Times, 31 March 1993: A8.

⁹³John McCain cited in Maze, "Role review," 21.

duplication. Closely paralleled to the GNA publicity campaign initiated by Nunn and Goldwater over unification, a similar campaign over duplication and inefficiencies of service roles and missions has been waged. Since Nunn's July 2nd floor speech, articles have proliferated in newspapers, magazines and professional journals, debating the issues of duplication and redundancy within the military Services. As with GNA, it appears members of Congress have begun to drum up support, in the early stages, for what they hope will ultimately lead to significant service streamlining. Congress' position is clear, reduce military spending that eliminates duplication and inefficiencies and still maintain a strong defense. However, this is easier said than done. For every argument that seeks an end to costly duplication and redundancy, there is a rational argument against. The Services have provided such arguments.

B. DOD RESPONSE

In an early response to the call for dramatic military reorganization, Colonel William Smullen (spokesperson for CJCS Powell), indicated that any recommendations made in the roles and missions report would not call for radically reshaping the four Services, but would make recommendations to make the Services more efficient. Smullen noted, "In some instances, changes that the report will propose 'will be viewed by some inside the services as

revolutionary,'. . . But to those outside the services, 'they will seem less dramatic.'⁹⁴

Chairman Powell, during a 28 July SASC hearing, responded to repeated criticisms as to why land and sea services required their own air forces. Powell stated:

We get beaten up in the press for having four air forces, but I say thank God Congress in its wisdom gave us four air forces. The question isn't how to get rid of [some of the air forces, but how to] make them more complimentary and not redundant.⁹⁵

Powell went on to testify that duplication has enabled the Services to provide the nation much greater military capability. Many strategists concur with Powell's philosophy in this regard. Mackubin Thomas Owens offers a very stimulating analysis of Senator Nunn's quest for maximum efficiency:

Where the accountant (read Congress) seeks efficiency, the advocate of a strategic capabilities approach to roles and functions (the "Strategist") seeks "military effectiveness;" ensuring that the nation has the proper tools to defend its interests, and to win wars if they come. Where the accountant sees duplication, the strategist sees *redundancy*, the military obligation to have enough means to ensure victory, and *complimentary*, a broad range of unique capabilities that can be brought to bear as required by the situation. Where the accountant sees wasteful duplication between naval aviation and landbased aviation and between the Army and Marines, the military planner sees an array of tools that allows him to fulfill different operational needs and meet different strategic requirements.⁹⁶

⁹⁴William Smullen cited in William Mathews, "On a role: Lawmakers rev up to restructure the military," Army Times, 10 August 1992: 28.

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Accountants VS. Strategists: The New Roles And Missions Debate," Strategic Review, (Fall 1992): 7-8.

Owens does not discard the fact that efficiency has a place in military affairs and that DOD has room for cutting costs. His concern is if changes are made, they be made in light of strategic requirements vice efficiency. An illustration of stressing efficiency over strategic requirements occurred in the 1960's by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. As Owens argued, McNamara confused "accounting with strategy" and attempted to force the same airframe on the Navy and Air Force that resulted in the TFX controversy.⁹⁷

Owens's analysis is important because it represents the current philosophy of Chairman Powell and the Services. It also provides rationale as to why the military Services are unable to provide revolutionary changes in their roles, missions and functions. Throughout Chairman Powell's February 1993 report entitled, *"Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States,"* references are made supporting this philosophy. For example, Powell, on page ix of the executive summary, illustrates the advantages in having complementary capabilities among the services. He indicates that flexibility at the national command level provides additional options to senior decision-makers in a crisis. In addition, theater CINCs "can more effectively tailor a military response to any contingency, regardless of location."⁹⁸ A second example can be found on

⁹⁷Ibid.

⁹⁸Colin L. Powell, "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States,"

page I-12. Powell states, "We cannot preserve our military strength if we place perceived economy ahead of proven effectiveness, or if we place one Service or component ahead of the others."⁹⁹ There are other examples, but the point is made - that the Services under the current leadership of Chairman Powell will be unable to eliminate duplication and inefficiencies, less recommend, as envisioned by members of Congress.

Chairman Powell's report does address what it considers significant change that has taken place over the past three years and proposes some significant additional changes in Chapter III. According to Powell, the creation of United States Strategic Command (StratCom) that combined all strategic bombers, missiles and submarines under one command, represent "the most dramatic change in the assignment of roles and missions among the Services since 1947."¹⁰⁰ Additional changes have been: the elimination of nuclear functions for the Army and Marine Corps; elimination of chemical weapons use with the signing of the Chemical Weapons convention in Paris on 13 January 1993; and dramatic infrastructure changes that have seen a drawdown to Base Force levels and below.¹⁰¹

(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, February 1993) ix.

⁹⁹Ibid., I-12.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., vi.

¹⁰¹Ibid., vi-ix.

As for proposals for significant change, Powell recommended the creation of a new CINC for U.S. based forces, and further review of possible consolidation of U.S. Space Command with StratCom. There are many other specific recommendations within the 53 page Powell report that offer improvements needed to maintain maximum effectiveness of the Services.

Powell's overall objective for the report was to ensure the National Military Strategy of the United States was effectively aligned with force structure. Recommendations made affecting the roles, missions and functions of the Services were made with the objective to either maintain and if possible enhance the combat readiness of the Armed Forces in light of force reductions and reduced funding.

Powell's report has been assessed as falling short in the fundamental restructuring of military roles and missions as called for by Senator Nunn and others. Michael Gordon of the New York Times states, "it is more noteworthy for its objection to the view that Washington should eliminate duplication by realigning the missions of the three military Services."¹⁰² Powell himself has acknowledged that his recommendations have fallen short of those set by President Clinton during his election campaign.¹⁰³ Powell justified the way

¹⁰²Michael Gordon, "Report by Powell Challenges Calls To Revise Military," The New York Times, 31 December 1992: A1.

¹⁰³Clinton's goals mirrored those of Senator Nunn. John Lancaster, "Military Reshaping Plan Is Short of Clinton Goals," The Washington Post, 13 February 1993: A4.

his report reads, explaining that it was prepared during the Bush administration.¹⁰⁴

Although Powell has indicated the report is solely his and not a consensus report, much of the work was produced by the Pentagon's Joint Staff under Powell's direct supervision.¹⁰⁵ In addition, Powell's report contained the input of CINCs and other senior military officers. This has important implications in that Powell's report represents what the Services see as their vision of the future. If this is correct, it suggest a greater institutional barrier for Congress and the Clinton administration in their quest to cut military spending. Had Chairman Powell produced a report that met the expectations of Congress and the Clinton administration, it's very likely an inter-service brawl would have ensued. The question is then raised, Is the CJCS capable of producing such a report? After all, GNA strengthened the stature and authority of the Chairman for the very purpose of providing professional military advice that rises above the narrower interests of the individual Services.

According to General Lee Butler, CinCStratCom, the answer is yes. Butler indicated that a roles and missions report that provides revolutionary changes is possible. However, it would require a Chairman who possesses a strong vision. In addition, fundamental changes to the National Military Strategy

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

¹⁰⁵Barton Gellman, "Services Moving to Protect Turf," The Washington Post, 28 January 1992: A1.

would be necessary. Butler stressed that how we define such missions as *Forward Presence* and *Power Projection* will have to be re-defined. Butler's message was clear: if the Services are to rise above Cold War thinking and survive 200 billion dollar or less defense budgets, strong visionary leadership must emerge.¹⁰⁶

C. EXECUTIVE BRANCH RESPONSE

During President Clinton's campaign for the presidency, he vowed a rearrangement of service roles and missions. Clinton stated that as president he would call a meeting similar to the 1948 Key West conference. Clinton's goal is to have the service chiefs "hammer out a new understanding about consolidating and coordinating military roles and missions in the 1990s and beyond."¹⁰⁷

The Clinton administration's philosophy concerning military policy is closely related to that of Congress. Prior to taking office, Clinton denounced the Base Force plan as Cold War thinking. He called it "a scaled-down version of the Cold War military designed for warfare in Europe, ill-equipped to react fast enough or move far enough in an era when sudden regional wars are

¹⁰⁶General Lee Butler, CinCStratCom, Offutt AFB, interview by author, 9 March 1993.

¹⁰⁷Mathews, 12.

considered the most likely contingencies."¹⁰⁸ President Clinton is in total agreement with Senator Nunn's assessment that it is time to reevaluate the basic organization of our Armed Forces. Clinton indicated:

We have four separate air forces - one each for the Marines, Army, Navy and Air Force. Both the Army and Marines have light infantry divisions. The Navy and Air Force have separately developed, but similar, fighter aircraft and tactical missiles.¹⁰⁹

Clinton added that we can reduce redundancies while respecting each Service's unique capabilities, and save billions of dollars.¹¹⁰

Although Clinton has expressed to resolve the issues surrounding roles and missions, the question remains as to whether he is prepared to expend the required political capital if defense reforms are to be implemented successfully. Critics might argue that Clinton has already used-up valuable capital over gays in the military, and his failed economic stimulus package. The importance of political capital was illustrated by President Reagan when he chose not to provide defense secretary Casper Weinberger with much needed political capital in his fight against the Goldwater - Nichols legislation. The result was Weinberger's failure and eventual retreat against GNA legislation.

James Blackwell and Barry Blechman illustrate why bringing reform to the Pentagon is so difficult. They argue that reform has an adverse affect on

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

¹⁰⁹Gordon, A1.

¹¹⁰Ibid.

certain bureaucratic organizations and other institutions with self-interest. Many of these affected organizations have close allies in Congress, which makes passing reform legislation very difficult.¹¹¹

According to Blackwell and Blechman, Clinton's success at realigning military roles and missions will certainly depend upon his Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin. Blackwell and Blechman state, "The most important person in consummating the reform of the defense establishment is the secretary of defense. . . ." ¹¹² Aspin, while serving as Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, made his mark as a reformer by presenting four alternative force structures. "Option C" became the most widely publicized of the four. Aspin indicated that "Option C" was his preferred option, and that it served to illustrate that deeper reductions beyond the Bush administration's Base Force were needed.¹¹³

Aspin will definitely pursue some level of Pentagon reform when he completes a "comprehensive 'bottom-up' review this summer."¹¹⁴ In response to Powell's report, Aspin has directed a second roles, missions and functions

¹¹¹James A. Blackwell Jr., and Barry M. Blechman, Making Defense Reform work (Brassey's (US), INC., Washington, New York, 1990), 267.

¹¹²Ibid., 268.

¹¹³Les Aspin, "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era: Four Illustrative Options (House Armed Services Committee), 25 February 1992.

¹¹⁴Schmitt, A8.

report to be completed by May of 1993. Vital to this subsequent report, the Joint Staff is currently working with the Clinton administration on a new National Security Strategy.¹¹⁵ Clinton's National Security Strategy will provide the broad policy guidance necessary for a detailed review of the roles, missions, and functions of the Armed Forces. If the Services are forced into a fight for their survival, the summer of 1993 may truly turn out to be one hot summer.

In conclusion, this chapter sought to illustrate the views of Congress, Services and Executive Branch in thier evaluation of eliminating duplication and inefficiencies within service roles and missions. The intent of Senator Nunn's floor speech is to create debate over roles and missions and provide examples where there appears to be substantial duplication and the opportunity for streamlining. Nunn's fear and the fear of other congressional members, is that if needless duplication and inefficiencies are not eliminated during declining defense budgets, the result will lead to a diminished military capability or hollow force. The Services on the other hand argue that duplication has enabled the nation much greater military capability. Chairman Powell and the Services stand behind the changes that have already taken place. They argue that the realignment of our nuclear triad under one command represents the most dramatic change in the assignment of roles and

¹¹⁵Captain Ronald D. Gumbert, USN, Assistant Deputy Director for Strategic Plans & Policy, The Joint Staff, interview by Author, 4 March 1993.

missions since 1947. The Services contend the recommendations made in Powell's roles and missions report fully support the strategic direction promulgated by the National Security and Military Strategies of the United States. The Executive Branch has responded to the link between National strategy and roles and missions, and has begun re-writing current U.S. strategies. A subsequent roles and missions report has been directed to be completed by late summer 1993. President Clinton's response to the roles and missions debate has mirrored that of Senator Nunn. The question that faces Clinton is will he be capable of expending the necessary political capital required to successfully implement significant defense reform.

V. DEFENSE POLICYMAKING: LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

In a letter to Senator Nunn SASC Chairman, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin indicated that "the proper assignment of roles, missions, and functions to the military Services is vital to ensuring that our forces are the most effective possible at any given level of resources."¹¹⁶ It is for this reason that Aspin asserts that service roles, missions and functions will be an integral part of his comprehensive "bottom-up" review due this summer. Aspin identifies four considerations that OSD and the Joint Staff is to draw upon during their review and recommendations on service roles and missions:

- How do the new post-Cold War dangers impact upon the assignment of Service roles and functions? Will the Services need to assume new responsibilities to meet these dangers?
- Do technological challenges and opportunities require changes in the assignment of Service roles and functions?
- Will proposed changes produce significant cost savings?
- Are proposed changes realistically achievable in light of existing organizational arrangements, sunk costs, and political circumstances?¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, to Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman Senate Armed Services Committee, Letter accompanying Joint Chiefs of Staff's Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States. No date. Received from the Office of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 15 April 1993, 31-34.

¹¹⁷Ibid.

While all of Aspin's questions are relevant in the review of roles and missions, it is his last category that more closely pertains to the process of reform and will provide the focus for this chapter. This chapter will examine the constraints and implications of defense policymaking in regards to the ability of Congress, Services and Executive Branch to realign, consolidate or even abolish service roles and missions.

A. CONGRESSIONAL DECISIONMAKING

How capable will Congress be in handling defense policy formulation and implementation? This very contentious question confronts both Senator Nunn and his congressional backers in their quest to eliminate duplication and inefficiencies within the Services. The question is contentious for several reasons. First, if Congress is forced to formulate defense policy regarding service roles and missions, it would be doing what critics argue as something it is institutionally not well suited to do.¹¹⁸ Robert Art argues that it is the task of the Executive Branch to initiate policy and that of the Congress to judge policy. Art states,

The tasks of initiating and judging derive from the organizational differences between bureaucracies and legislatures. Congress' organizational structure is more nearly horizontal in nature; the executive branch's, more nearly hierarchical. As a decentralized institution, congress can never achieve the degree of centralized control that is requisite to

¹¹⁸Robert J. Art, "Congress And The Defense Budget: New Procedures And Old Realities," in Toward A More Effective Defense, ed. Barry M. Blechman and William J. Lynn (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company 1985) 151.

develop, coordinate, and reconcile competing policy positions-all of which are necessary steps for policy initiation. What Congress is uniquely positioned organizationally to do is to judge.¹¹⁹

There are those who would argue against Art's argument claiming Goldwater-Nichols legislation as an example of Congress' ability to formulate defense policy. This counter may appear sound. However, there is a significant difference between the type of legislation achieved in the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), and the type of legislation associated with reorganizing service roles and missions.

This leads us to a second point of contention: the impact upon the budget. Where GNA was structure and authority, roles and missions involves major force programs and specific weapon systems. When Senator Nunn asks the question "why do we need four air forces," he is hitting the nerve belonging to many congressional members that senses danger when defense-related jobs are threatened.

A third point of contention is thus, constituent-oriented concerns. Formulating defense policy that seeks to realign, consolidate or abolish service roles and missions may prove too difficult for legislators who are less concerned with formulating policy and more concerned with satisfying narrow constituent-oriented concerns. Barry Blechman argues that members of

¹¹⁹Ibid.

Congress are motivated by the desire to provide "pork" for their constituents and tend to ignore the policy aspect of issues.¹²⁰

Not all political analysts agree with the constraints against Congress in the realm of policy formulation. James Lindsay recognizes several incentives that exist for congressional members to take on policy issues. The first is parochialism. Congressional members will turn to policy arguments to help win broader support in attacking other rival initiatives and for protecting ones own favored program. A second incentive to tackle policy issues is ambition. Policy issues can make congressional members appear more 'statesmanlike' and thereby helping the member to get re-elected or to gain power within Congress. Lindsay's third incentive is duty. Congressional members often times consider policy issues as part of their job.¹²¹

The implications of the constraints illustrated seem to suggest that Congress should stay-out of future defense policy formulation. On the other hand, Lindsay's incentives to tackle policy coupled with congressional activism displayed during the 1980's and early 90's suggest that Congress may be capable of handling post-Cold War defense policy. This controversy takes us

¹²⁰Paul Stockton, "The Congressional Response," in Reconstituting National Defense: The New National Security Strategy, Naval Postgraduate School Document NPS-NS-91-012, 30 September 1991, p.88.

¹²¹Stockton, Policymaking For The Post-Cold War Era, 3.

back to our original question, how capable will Congress be in handling defense policy formulation and implementation?

In the book Congress and Nuclear Weapons, James Lindsay argues that congressional decisionmaking can be explained by viewing the process through three "conceptual lenses": deferential, parochial, and policy. The deferential lens predicts that members of congress will defer to the President on weapons acquisition issues. The parochial lens asserts that members evaluate weapons systems based on what is good for their constituents and pay little attention to what is good for the national interest. The policy lens contends that members do care about the issues surrounding weapons programs and are genuinely concerned about how weapon systems protect the national interests.¹²²

Although Lindsay's work primarily focuses on nuclear weapons programs, he does apply the "conceptual lenses" approach to conventional weapons and military bases. I contend the debate over roles, missions and functions of the Armed Forces of the United States currently can be examined through the policy lens. However, I argue that once Defense Secretary Les Aspin completes his "bottom-up" review, and yields detailed guidance for reshaping America's defense forces, the debate can better be examined through the parochial lens. The debate over roles and missions closely resembles the debate which took place over base closures in the late 1980s and present. Lindsay argues, ". . .the

¹²²James Lindsay, Congress and Nuclear Weapons (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1991) 123.

parochial lens appears to best explain how Congress handles DOD's requests on military bases."¹²³ In regards to the service roles and missions debate, Senator Nunn's quest to eliminate duplication and inefficiencies can best be explained through the policy lens. However, when the rubber meets the road, Congress' capability in handling defense policy is best examined through the parochial lens.

1. THE POLICY LENS

According to Lindsay, "People run for Congress because they want to shape public policy and further what they see as the common good."¹²⁴ However, political analyst often argue that policy matters give-way to reelection concerns. Lindsay recognizes that reelection is a necessary goal if legislators are to pursue their policy objectives. But within the policy lens, Lindsay argues, "electorial incentives do not simply constrain legislative behavior; they also encourage members to address policy issues."¹²⁵ Addressing policy issues appears responsible and "statesmanlike" to constituents and in turn proves to be good electoral politics.¹²⁶

¹²³Ibid., 133.

¹²⁴Ibid.

¹²⁵Ibid., 16.

¹²⁶Ibid.

In addition, addressing defense policy may also allow congressional members to build a reputation as a "player" in Congress. Lindsay illustrates:

Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), for example, used his expertise on defense matters to become a major figure in the Senate. Becoming a player in Congress offers several benefits. A legislative player by definition exercises more influence within Congress, influence that can be used to benefit constituents. Establishing a reputation as a player attracts the attention of interest groups that can provide the contributions in cash and kind needed to run a congressional reelection campaign. And being recognized as a congressional powerbroker helps gain attention back home, thereby providing free advertising for the next campaign.¹²⁷

It is through this type of conceptual lens that explains why Senator Nunn and his congressional supporters have initiated a debate over service roles and missions. The substantive issues surrounding roles and missions has provided an excellent stage to appear "statesmanlike" and responsible. Anticipating the absence of any significant change in General Powell's February roles and missions report, Senator Nunn saw the opportunity to take centerstage on such a controversial policy issue.

Senator Nunn's fear that a failure to eliminate needless duplication and inefficiencies will lead to a diminished military capability is no doubt sincere. In the absence of appropriate policy guidance from the Executive Branch, Senator Nunn and supporters will attempt to formulate their own defense policy. When recommendations are made as to where cuts will come from, congressional members will begin to measure the affects of defense

¹²⁷Ibid., 16-17.

reorganization in their own districts and challenge recommendations that hit the hardest. It is at this point when the roles and missions debate will begin to closely resemble the base closure debates. From this view, the parochial lens appears to best explain how Congress might handle the roles and missions debate.

2. THE PAROCHIAL LENS

According to Lindsay ". . . while individual legislators often act parochial, Congress as an institution usually does not."¹²⁸ The roles and missions debate will be one of the rare instances in which Congress, as an institution, will act parochially. Unlike most weapons systems and defense programs, which affect only certain areas of the country, the roles and missions issue affects a much broader spectrum.

Eliminating duplication and inefficiencies within service roles and missions to the level that has been called for by Senator Nunn would impact practically every spending category within DOD. Redefining the structure and composition of U.S. forces affects everything from highly contested base closing and cutting reserves to individual service programs. In order to fulfil policy initiatives that redefine force structure, spending levels of budget line items must change. It is no wonder General David Jones labeled eliminating

¹²⁸Ibid., 131.

duplication and inefficiencies within service roles and missions a problem "too hard" to solve.¹²⁹

Driven by "pork instincts," members of Congress will reject President Clinton's proposals in their attempt to protect constituent benefits. House Armed Services Committee Chairman, Rep. Ronald Dellums D-CA., stated in a 23 May 1993 NBC news broadcast that he would utilize every bit of power within his chairmanship to protect his San Francisco Bay area constituents from military cuts. This is contradictory to the 31 March 1993 New York Times article that was presented in Chapter IV, whereby Dellums accused Aspin of presenting a budget reminiscent of the Cold War era. In addition, Dellums complained about the significant costs in delaying inevitable adjustments to a post-Cold War military. This contradiction serves to illustrate how parochial behavior of Congressional members will dominate their decisionmaking as defense spending cuts take shape.

Congress, as viewed through the parochial lens, will be unable to formulate and implement appropriate defense reorganization that eliminates duplication and inefficiencies within service roles and missions. This is not to say Congress has no role in implementing defense policy. Congress through its appropriations process has a "*de facto*" role in implementing broad policy shifts by altering defense budget line items and making other detailed

¹²⁹General David Jones cited in Nunn, Floor Speech, 3.

legislative changes."¹³⁰ Congress does cut defense programs and they have been doing so since 1985. However, the programs cut have been weapons programs, and jobs for these programs are typically concentrated in a very limited number of congressional districts. In this regard, Paul Stockton states, ". . . legislators have lacked a direct parochial interest in specific funding disputes."¹³¹ Thus, past defense cuts are not representative of Congress' ability to formulate and implement defense policy associated with roles and missions. As previously stated, roles and missions affect a much broader spectrum than do most weapon systems and defense programs. Base closures and Reserve issues more closely resemble the hard choices that lay ahead for post-Cold War defense policy.

The significant relationship between base closures and Reserve issues with defense policymaking is the by-product of the congressional decisionmaking that results. Parochialism does not prevent bases from being closed or Reserves from being cut, on the contrary bases are being closed and Reserve levels are coming down. However, if Congress is forced into defense policy formulation regarding service roles and missions the impact will most likely result in a compromise of smaller forces, instead of the hard choices of consolidating or abolishing roles and missions. If Congress is to bring about

¹³⁰Stockton, Defense Policymaking, 5.

¹³¹Ibid.

significant change in the Service's roles and missions, Congress will need to take a similar approach, as it did with the base closure commission. The impact of reorganizing service roles and missions that truly eliminate the duplication and inefficiencies has too great of an impact upon congressional members reelection incentives and constituent benefits. Morris Fiorina illustrates the result when Congress avoids the substance of policy issues: "Public policy emerges from the system almost as an afterthought. The shape of policy is a by-product of the way the system operates, rather than a consciously directed effort to deal with social and economic problems."¹³² The by-product in the case of defense reorganization will be a smaller version of the force we currently have. The result will lead to a diminished military capability or hollow force.

B. THE SERVICES

The heart of the roles and missions debate is the concern over duplication and inefficiencies that exist within the military. The least likely group capable of proposing reform that would eliminate or reduce these concerns is the Services themselves. The case was made in Chapter IV when General Powell testified that duplication has enabled the Services to provide the nation much greater military capability. In addition, what Powell and the Services see as significant change (read force structure) and what Congress sees as significant

¹³²Lindsay, Congress and Nuclear Weapons, 13.

change (read budget) are very different. These are not the only reasons the Services are incapable of reorganizing themselves. Institutional barriers, sunk costs and the powerful political force of uncertainty and threat are factors as well. A brief look at each will illustrate why the Services are the least capable in reforming themselves.

1. Institutional Barriers

Carl Builder teaches us that institutions such as the Navy, Air Force and Army, "while composed of many, ever-changing individuals, have distinct and enduring personalities of their own that govern much of their behavior."¹³³ For example, the Navy according to Builder is marked by two personalities, its independence and stature.

The Department of the Navy . . . is the most strategically independent of the services-it has its own army, navy and air force. It is least dependent on others. It would prefer to be given a mission, retain complete control over all the assets, and be left alone.¹³⁴

It should be no surprise the Navy opposed not only GNA, but practically every legislation that sought to reorganize U.S defense forces since the Act of 1798 establishing the Department of the Navy. According to Builder, "the unique service identities . . . are likely to persist for a very long time."¹³⁵

¹³³Carl H. Builder, The Masks Of War, 3.

¹³⁴General David Jones cited in Builder, The Masks Of War, 31.

¹³⁵*Ibid.*, 39.

Organizational theory tells us that military organizations like all large organizations are noted for their resistance to change. A popular military maxim taken out of the Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations illustrates this point: "Any change, even for the better, is to be deprecated."¹³⁶ According to Liddell Hart, "The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out."¹³⁷

In a 16 December 1982 SASC Hearing, General David Jones provided a very descriptive illustration of the U.S. military establishments resistance to change.

By their very nature, large organizations have a built-in resistance to change. As the largest organization in the free world, our defense establishment -the Department of Defense -has most of the problems of a large corporation but lacks an easily calculated "bottom line" to force needed change. At the core are the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps: institutions that find it difficult to adapt to changing conditions because of understandable attachments to the past. The very foundation of each service rests on imbuing its members with pride in its missions, its doctrine and its customs and discipline-all of which are steeped in traditions. While these deepseated service distinctions are important in fostering a fighting spirit, cultivating them engenders tendencies to look inward and to insulate the institutions against outside challenges. The history of our services includes striking examples of ideas and inventions whose time had come, but which were resisted because they did not fit into existing service concepts. The Navy kept building sailing ships long after the advent of steam power. Machine guns and tanks were developed in the United States, but our Army rejected them until long after they were accepted in Europe. The horse cavalry survived essentially unchanged right up until World War II despite evidence that its utility was greatly diminished decades earlier. Even Army Air Corps officers

¹³⁶SASC Staff report, The Need For Change, 624.

¹³⁷Ibid.

were required to wear spurs until the late 1930's. But the armed services are only part of the problem. The Defense Department has evolved into a grouping of large, rigid bureaucracies-services, agencies, staffs, boards and committees-which embrace the past and adapt new technology to fit traditional missions and methods. There is no doubt that the cavalry leaders would have quickly adopted a horse which went farther and faster -a high-technology stallion. The result of this rigidity has been an ever-widening gap between the need to adapt to changing conditions and our ability to do so.¹³⁸

Although GNA has empowered the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide recommendations for change, free of service influence and at least once every three years; General Powell's current report illustrates that organizational and procedural deficiencies still exist. Critics claim Powell's report offers little more than defending the status quo.

2. Sunk Costs

William Lucas and Raymond Dawson provide excellent analysis as to why consolidating or eliminating duplicative activities has been difficult for the DOD. They argue that using the budget as an instrument of control is ineffective because, "by the time an activity is recognized as duplicative, it may be too late. . . . "Sunk costs" and organizational barriers to transferring activities often make it simpler to accept the duplication."¹³⁹

Lucas and Dawson indicate that duplication is the result of the absence of jurisdictional boundaries, or boundaries made obsolete or ambiguous by

¹³⁸Ibid., 624-625.

¹³⁹Lucas and Dawson, 45.

advancing social or technological change. The Services have recognized the incentive to establish itself in a field prior to any jurisdictional lines being drawn. Once a function or mission becomes of greater importance, history has shown (e.g., IRBM competition and Air Defense controversy) that early investment weighs heavily in future organizational bargaining.¹⁴⁰

When conflict does arise over jurisdiction, it has usually centered around the transfer of jurisdictions alone. Establishing a program, buying the material, and training the personnel is often a major investment. Lucas and Dawson contend that when faced with prospect of having to close one program and expand the same activity in another department, those faced with the decision are likely to keep the status quo. According to Lucas and Dawson, ". . . major investment in training and experience is not transferable when the personnel are not; the costs of moving a jurisdiction from one military service to another therefore, become virtually prohibitive."¹⁴¹ Lucas and Dawson conclude:

Even when an iron-clad case can be made for the transfer and consolidation of an activity, it is often not worth the political costs. The distinctive nature of the military services thus helps to preclude simple reallocation of established jurisdictions. Duplication, once established and allowed to grow to significant proportions, is very hard to eliminate.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰Ibid.

¹⁴¹Ibid., 46.

¹⁴²Ibid.

Lucas and Dawson offer very detailed examples in the IRBM competition and air defense controversy. These two examples serve to illustrate how "sunk costs" have made eliminating duplicative efforts extremely difficult for decision-makers. In the case of the air defense controversy over the Hercules and Bomarc missiles, OSD watched the two programs grow and was unable to choose between the two. The matter became so contentious that in 1959 Secretary of Defense, Neil McElroy, admitted to SASC that he was incapable of choosing between the two air defense missiles. He stated, "it would not bother me if you held our feet in the fire and forced us in connection with this budget."¹⁴³ In result, SASC cut the Nike Hercules program, however, HASC did the opposite and chose to cut the Bomarc program. This split forced OSD to bring forward a "Master Plan" for air defense. Predictably OSD's plan called for reduced programs in both missiles. In the end, both Hercules and Bomarc survived as equivalents.¹⁴⁴

To complicate matters worse, the Army and the Air Force in both cases argued that their programs were not merely duplicative, but added an important and different capability. In addition, the Services were supported by constituencies outside DOD. Foremost being Congress. In the case of the IRBM competition, many proponents were ardent partisans of different

¹⁴³Secretary of Defense cited in Lucas and Dawson, 51.

¹⁴⁴Ibid., 51-52.

systems. For example, "One official remarked that if the OSD cancelled the Thor, 'a Congressional delegation from California would be down our necks [Douglas Aircraft was a prime contractor] while a cancellation of Jupiter would have the Alabama and Michigan delegations up in arms [Chrysler was to produce Jupiter]'.¹⁴⁵

The impact of "sunk costs" determining the fate of a particular mission or function can readily be seen in General Powell's current roles and missions report. The concept of consolidating and moving Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard helicopter training from Pensacola, Florida to Fort Rucker, Alabama, is being considered based on its "sunk costs". The question of consolidating C-130 operations, management, and support was recommended against based on decreased operational effectiveness and "sunk costs". Other examples include: consolidating Construction Engineers; Should Navy EP-3E and Air Force RC-135 Electronic Surveillance Aircraft both be retained? Should the Army provide Tanks and MLRS to the Marine Corps?¹⁴⁶

3. Uncertainty and Threat

DOD is also found at a disadvantage in reducing duplication because of uncertainty and threat. Lucas and Dawson argue that together, they become a powerful political force supporting duplication. They define uncertainty as

¹⁴⁵Ibid., 49.

¹⁴⁶Colin Powell, Report on Roles, xxii-xxx.

"the doubt that a given set of organizational programs will achieve a corresponding set of organizational goals. Threat is defined as "an inherent environmental condition: the price or the penalty which organization and the constituencies it seems will have to pay in the event that its efforts and programs should fail to achieve those goals."¹⁴⁷

Lucas and Dawson illustrate the dynamics of organizational behavior regarding uncertainty and threat in the super-carrier and B-36 bomber conflict. In 1949, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson pressed for budget reductions by seeking a judgement from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the continued construction of a super, flush-deck carrier for the Navy. With the support a split vote (the Chief of Naval Operations in lone dissent), Johnson cancelled the prototype aircraft carrier, which was the Navy's claim to a major role in atomic warfare. Johnson's goal was to suppress the Navy's act of duplication. The Navy responded by initiating "OP 23", which sought to manipulate uncertainty regarding strategic bombing as a viable national strategy. However, the writing was on the wall suggesting that the post-war Congress was only going to support a military force that contained aviation forces with nuclear capabilities.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷Lucas and Dawson, 55.

¹⁴⁸Ibid., 56.

The essence of the Navy's revolt thus became defense of duplication. The Navy centered their argument around a challenge to the B-36 as a weapon sufficiently capable of delivering an atomic bomb on target. Testifying before Congress, the Navy emphasized the capability of Soviet radar and questioned the B-36's ability to penetrate Soviet airspace against Soviet jet fighters. In addition, the Navy questioned the accuracy of high-altitude bombing. By exposing the vulnerabilities of the B-36, the Navy created uncertainty as to the ability of the Air Force to perform strategic bombing by themselves. The Navy offering Congress insurance, argued that a Navy carrier strike force had the capability to do what the B-36 might not be able to do; deliver an atomic bomb on target. The Navy lost their super-carrier for a short period until resources became more plentiful, but the Navy's goal of duplicating a strategic bombing role for Navy aviation was sanctioned.¹⁴⁹ Lucas and Dawson conclude that uncertainty is an incentive for duplicative efforts.¹⁵⁰

Threat works in conjunction with uncertainty. During the Cold War era the threat to U.S. security was perceived as being very high. With the complete destruction of the U.S. as the consequence of war, the costs of error in a major policy decision were profound that almost any doubt was intolerable.

¹⁴⁹When resources did become more plentiful, the carrier the Navy did receive was much different in design than the super-carrier USS United States. This point is made, so as not to confuse the reader in thinking the Navy ultimately received the USS United States.

¹⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 57.

According to Lucas and Dawson, "The magnitude of the threat, therefore, served to magnify the need for certainty, and the compelling drive was to be as sure as possible about the success of the organizational goals in defense."¹⁵¹ It is under these circumstances that the Services competed in risk-reduction by advancing individual programs and "to achieve a significant political effect by manipulating uncertainty."¹⁵² The importance of Lucas and Dawson's threat and uncertainty lesson is its value in understanding the current roles and missions debate, and how defense policy for the post-Cold War environment will be played out. General Powell has already played the threat and uncertainty card in justifying programs for his Base Force plan, stressing that "The Cold War era has given way to a new era of uncertainty and unrest."¹⁵³

C. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

According to James Blackwell and Barry Blechman, "The most important person in consummating the reform of the defense establishment is the secretary of defense, . . ."¹⁵⁴ They also conclude that "The President must be prepared to back the Secretary of Defense with political capital if defense

¹⁵¹Ibid., 60.

¹⁵²Ibid.

¹⁵³Powell, Roles and Missions Report, I-4.

¹⁵⁴Blackwell and Blechman, Making Defense Reform Work, 268.

reforms are to be implemented successfully."¹⁵⁵ Based upon these two assumptions, I argue that Secretary of Defense Les Aspin with his congressional background has the best opportunity to formulate and implement defense policy shaped for a post-Cold War environment.

Any reform sought by the Clinton administration that goes beyond evolutionary changes will undoubtedly be met with substantial criticism from bureaucratic organizations and other institutions who's self interest is adversely affected. The challenges confronting revolutionary changes may prove to be too big a hurdle for President Clinton to expend the required political capital necessary to pass such reform. Aware of institutional and bureaucratic barriers, Les Aspin will likely seek a defense policy that will reflect his congressional experience and be a policy workable to both Services and Congress.

Aspin has already taken important steps in squelching future battles with Congress. He has imported over a dozen House staff members as top aides, ordered overhaul of the foreign and domestic policy arms to focus on specific issues the way congressional subcommittees do, and raised the sensitivity level of pentagon planners to budget cuts that Congress might oppose.¹⁵⁶

Critical to any reform effort will be President Clinton's new National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. Clinton and Aspin must

¹⁵⁵Ibid., 267.

¹⁵⁶Eric Schmitt, "Charting a Course at the Pentagon, Aspin Uses His Congressional Map," The New York Times, 17 February 1993, A13.

provide a vision outlining U.S. interests and objectives that will serve as broad policy guidance necessary for a detailed review of the Services roles, missions and functions. According to Bob Woodward in a 21 February 1993 interview with Les Aspin, "Nothing bothers Aspin more than using 'subjective analysis' to make important decisions."¹⁵⁷ Aspin has criticized Powell's Base Force calling it "a defense budget by subtraction - simply buying less of the Cold War forces."¹⁵⁸ Woodward indicates that Aspin's "bottom-up review" is essentially a systems analysis approach.¹⁵⁹ The important point about Aspin's systems analysis approach to restructuring the military is the impact it will have on defense policy implementation. When the defense budget goes in front of Congress, Aspin's recommendations will have concrete justifications.

Before Clinton and Aspin can go forward with defense reorganization, Aspin must have the support of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services. This may prove to be as formidable a challenge as dealing with Congress. According to Michael Gordon of the New York Times, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Congress on 19 May 1993, that "the readiness to go to war

¹⁵⁷Bob Woodward, "The Secretary Of Analysis," The Washington Post Magazine, 21 February 1993, 9-30.

¹⁵⁸Ibid., 25.

¹⁵⁹Ibid.

could be jeopardized by continued reductions in spending."¹⁶⁰ Gordon asserts that the JCS warning was an indirect criticism of President Clinton's plans to trim military spending and opens up a "touchy political issue" for Clinton, who claims he is cutting the military responsibly and is not anti-military.¹⁶¹

The importance of having the CJCS and the Services on-board with SecDef Les Aspin magnifies the upcoming retirement of General Colin Powell. It will be critical for the Clinton Administration to select a new Chairman that has a vision in line with its own. Tradition indicates the Air Force is next in line for the premier military post. In addition, the selection of the CJCS post is not intended to be a politicized process. However, tradition will not outweigh the need for Les Aspin to make the right political choice.

In a move to protect the Clinton Administration from charges it is cutting defense spending too deeply, Aspin has appointed a panel of eight retired generals and admirals to explore the effects of budget cuts and to find better ways to measure the military.¹⁶² Aspin's move has created tension between himself and pentagon officials. Speaking in anonymity, military officials stated they thought "Mr. Aspin was trying to usurp responsibilities normally carried out by the military and to take the political initiative on an issue that

¹⁶⁰Michael Gordon, "Joint Chiefs Warn Congress Against More Military Cuts," The New York Times, A10.

¹⁶¹Ibid.

¹⁶²Ibid.

was a serious political liability for the last Democratic Administration."¹⁶³

Although heads are bumping now, Aspin's best shot at bringing the JCS and Services aboard will be his command of military and defense issues and leadership ability. If Aspin fails and the Services play their threat and uncertainty card successfully with Congress, the future characteristic of U.S. military forces will be nothing more than a smaller version of what we currently have.

In conclusion, this chapter has examined constraints and implications in defense policymaking for the post-Cold War era from three separate perspectives. The first perspective was that of Congress. This section focused on Congress' ability to formulate and implement defense policy that seeks to eliminate duplication and inefficiencies within the Services roles and missions.

Critics argue that Congress as an institution is not well suited to carryout defense policy formulation. Robert Art supports this maxim stating, "As a decentralized institution, Congress can never achieve the degree of centralized control that is requisite to develop, coordinate, and reconcile competing policy positions. . . ."¹⁶⁴ On the other hand, analysts like James Lindsay argue that incentives exist for Congressional members to take on policy issues. Lindsay

¹⁶³Ibid.

¹⁶⁴Art, Congress And The Defense Budget, 151.

identifies parochialism, ambition and duty as incentives for congressional members to tackle defense policy issues.

In the book, Congress And Nuclear Weapons, James Lindsay argues that congressional decisionmaking can be explained by viewing the process through three "conceptual lenses": deferential, parochial and policy. It is through these lenses that I argue Congress's ability to formulate and implement defense policy relating to the roles and missions debate can best be explained. The policy lens best explains Senator Nunn's quest to eliminate duplication and inefficiencies. However, when congressional members begin to measure the affects of defense reorganization in their own districts legislators will be driven by "pork instincts" in an attempt to protect constituent benefits. The parochial lens in this case offers the best explanation of Congress' defense policymaking ability.

The second perspective is that of the Services. The Services are the least likely group capable of proposing any wholesale changes that would eliminate duplication and inefficiencies in their roles and missions. I argue that institutional barriers, sunk costs and the use of uncertainty and threat all factor in the inability of the Services to reform themselves.

The third perspective is that of the Executive Branch. I argue that Defense Secretary Les Aspin, with his congressional experience, has the best opportunity to formulate and implement significant defense reform. However, his success is dependent upon several factors. First, President Clinton must be

prepared to back Aspin with the required political capital. It is questionable as to how much support Clinton will be able to provide the Secretary of Defense in light of his failed economic stimulus package and his current battles over gays in the military and Energy Bill. Second, the Clinton Administration must produce a National Security Strategy that provides a vision outlining U.S. interests and objectives that will serve as broad policy guidance necessary for a detailed review of service roles and missions. Finally, Aspin must have the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Services if he is to be successful. This may prove to be the most difficult hurdle for Aspin of the three. In light of this factor, Aspin must make the right choice in the replacement of General Colin Powell. The new Chairman must possess vision and strong leadership capable of uniting the Services in support of a reform effort. The Joint Chiefs have already waived the warning flag in front of Congress stressing that the readiness of the Military to go to war could be jeopardized by continued reductions in spending.

VI CONCLUSION

The geopolitical changes that have fundamentally altered the threats to U.S. national security combined with rising budget deficits have created an opportunity and necessity for change throughout the Department of Defense. These events will not only reduce the size of the defense budget, but propel an overall reconsideration of the Services roles, missions and functions. Senator Sam Nunn SASC Chairman, in a July 2 floor speech entitled, *The Defense Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul The Services Roles And Missions*, argued that our nation can no longer afford inter-service rivalry, and that redundancy and duplication in the current allocation of roles and missions is costing billions of dollars each year.

Senator Nunn's speech on the Senate floor was a mandate for inter-service debate over roles and missions. The essence of his mandate is his fear that a failure to eliminate needless duplication and inefficiencies within the Services will lead to a "diminished" military capability. Nunn's speech was given in anticipation of General Powell's February 1993 report entitled, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States*. Powell's report suggested ways to make the military more efficient, but did not call for radically reshaping the four Services. The report "rebuffed" the type of consolidation that Congress and

President Clinton has called for. The dissatisfaction with the report for its possible lack of vision, highlights what is fast becoming the preeminent defense policy issue of the post-Cold War era.

In response to this defense policy issue, this thesis has examined the ability of the President, Congress and Armed Services to formulate and implement defense policy that eliminates duplication and inefficiencies within service roles, missions and functions. I argued that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in conjunction with the four military Services are unable as an organization to formulate any significant changes in their roles, missions and functions. In support of this claim, the first evidence presented stems from a dichotomy between what the Services see as significant change (read structure) and what Congress sees (read budget). Analysis provided in Chapter IV by Mackubin Thomas Owens puts this dichotomy into perspective. He argues that the Strategist (Services), seek military effectiveness at the cost of efficiency as opposed to Congress which seeks efficiency. The strategist also sees duplication as the military obligation to have enough means to ensure victory. In addition, it is complimentary and provides a broad range of unique capabilities that can be brought to bear as required by the situation. Where Congress may see wasteful duplication, the military planner sees an array of tools that will allow him/her to carryout a variety of operations and meet strategic requirements.

The dichotomy between the Services and Congress is not the only reason the Services are incapable of producing significant reform. Chapter V articulates three factors: institutional barriers, sunk costs and the political force of uncertainty and threat. Institutional barriers exists because large organizations have a built-in resistance to change. Carl Builder's analysis of the Services, illustrate that each service has distinct and enduring personalities that govern much of their behavior. According to Builder, the Navy is the most independent of the Services and would prefer to be given a mission, retain complete control over all the assets, and be left alone. General David Jones offers his own analysis of DOD indicating, "The Defense Department has evolved into a grouping of large, rigid bureaucracies-services, agencies, staffs, boards and committees-which embrace the past and adapt new technology to fit traditional missions and methods."¹⁶⁵

"Sunk costs" also produce barriers that prevent consolidating or eliminating duplicative activities. Utilizing William Lucas's and Raymond Dawson's analysis, I argue that, using the budget as an instrument of control is ineffective because "sunk costs" make it far easier to accept the existing duplication. The impact of "sunk costs" determining the fate of a particular mission or function can be seen in General Powell's current roles and missions report. The concept of consolidating and moving Navy, Marine Corps, and

¹⁶⁵SASC Staff report, The Need For Change, 624.

Coast Guard helicopter training from Pensacola, Florida to Fort Rucker, Alabama, is just one example provided, that is being considered based on its "sunk costs".

Uncertainty and threat also creates disadvantages for reducing duplication for the DOD. The Navy played both the uncertainty and threat card to Congress in the B-36 and super-carrier conflict. The Navy's success at creating uncertainty on the reliability of the B-36 as a weapon sufficiently capable of delivering an atomic bomb on target, assured the Navy of a strategic bombing role for Navy aviation. The magnitude of the Soviet threat magnified the need for certainty. The Services have competed in risk-reduction by advancing individual programs; thus, Congress was compelled throughout the Cold War to appropriate programs at the hand of service manipulation of uncertainty. The importance of threat and uncertainty plays an important role even today. It works both ways, as well. Just as the Services utilized the fear of uncertainty, Congress can eliminate individual programs i.e., SDI, based on a level of certainty that the threat that created the program is no longer real.

Congress' ability to formulate and implement defense policy that realigns, consolidates or abolishes service roles and missions, is much harder to determine. I argue three reasons as to why Congress is not well suited to formulate defense policy that seeks to eliminate duplication and inefficiencies within service roles and missions. First, formulating defense policy regarding service roles and missions would be doing what critics argue as something it

is institutionally not well suited to do. Robert Art argues it is the job of the Executive Branch to initiate policy and that of the Congress to judge policy.

Although "Congress tends to abhor a policy vacuum," and will push for their own proposals for change, this is not the case with roles and missions.¹⁶⁶ This leads to the second reason: the impact upon the budget. Unlike past reform efforts that were centered around structure and authority i.e., Goldwater-Nichols, legislation associated with reorganizing service roles and missions is centered around budget line-items. The third point is constituent-oriented concerns. Eliminating roles and missions may prove too difficult for legislators who are less concerned with formulating policy and more concerned with satisfying narrow constituent-oriented concerns.

Although Congress can play a "*de facto*" role in the implementation of defense policy through the appropriations process by altering funding levels, I conclude that Congress will find it difficult to implement broad policy that alters, consolidates or eliminates service roles and missions. I utilize James Lindsay's "conceptual lens" approach to explain this contention. I argue that Senator Nunn's quest to eliminate duplication and inefficiencies is best explained through Lindsay's policy lens. The substantive issues surrounding roles and missions has provided an excellent stage to appear "statesmanlike" and responsible. Anticipating the absence of any significant change in General

¹⁶⁶Stockton, Congress and Defense Policymaking, 28.

Powell's roles and missions report, Senator Nunn saw the opportunity to take centerstage on such a controversial policy issue.

Regardless of who formulates defense policy, when recommendations are made as to where cuts will come from, congressional members will begin to measure the affects of defense reorganization in their own districts and challenge recommendations that hit the hardest. In this light, Lindsay's parochial lens best explains Congress' ability to handle the roles and missions debate. Because roles and missions impacts practically every spending category within DOD, and closely resembles the base closure debates, Congress may have to take a similar approach to eliminating duplication, as it did with the base closure commission.

I argue that the Executive Branch under the leadership of Secretary of Defense Les Aspin has the best opportunity to formulate and implement significant defense policy. Several factors are presented in Chapter V that must occur, if Aspin is to be successful. First, Clinton must back Aspin with the required political capital. Second, the Clinton Administration must produce a National Security Strategy and Military Strategy that provides a vision outlining U.S. interests and objectives that will serve as broad policy guidance necessary for a detailed review of roles and missions. Third, Aspin must have the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services. The upcoming selection of the new CJCS is critical to the administration. Their choice must

be visionary and possess strong leadership that can unite the Services in supporting future reform.

Les Aspin's congressional experience coupled with his systems analyst approach to doing business, will prove successful in his quest to shape the Services for a post-Cold War environment. Aware of institutional and bureaucratic barriers, Aspin will seek a defense policy that reflects his congressional experience and be a policy workable to both Services and Congress.

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